There is a suit for partition pending between the petitioner on the one side and respondent Nos.4 to 10 on the other. The petitioner approached respondent No.3 with an application to impound [validate] an earlier partition deed purported to have been executed on 18-5-1978 between the parties thereto and receive necessary fee therefor. Respondent Nos.4 to 10 appear to have submitted their objections to the said application on the ground that the said partition deed is fabricated. Respondent No.3 has therefore passed the impugned order. On a careful analysis of the above reproduced provisions, I am of the opinion that the scheme underlying these provisions would only provide for ensuring payment of proper stamp duty on every instrument executed between the parties. These provisions do not, in any manner, lay down that collection of additional stamp duty in accordance with the rate prescribed there under would in a way establish the genuineness of the document impounded and in respect of which deficit stamp duty is collected. No mechanism is laid down under the scheme of the Act to hold an enquiry into the genuineness or otherwise of the documents nor any such requirement is laid down for the competent authority to get satisfied about such genuineness before collecting the deficit stamp duty. My view of this stands fortified by the Judgments of this court in Sai Motors Vs. K.Raja Reddy 1 and Burra Yadagiri and another Vs. Razia Begum and others 2. Though the counter affidavit has placed reliance on Circular dated 21-3-2009 of the Commissioner & Inspector General of Registration and Stamps, Andhra Pradesh, the law is well settled that the Circular cannot override the specific statutory provisions. In the premises as above, the Writ Petition is allowed. Respondent No.3 is directed to receive deficit stamp duty from the petitioners and release the document to them. It is however made clear that collection of deficit stamp duty by respondent No.3 does not amount to his accepting the genuineness or otherwise of the document which issue requires to be adjudicated by the Court before which the civil suit between the parties is pending if such an issue is raised by the respondent Nos.4 to 10 or any other party to the suit.
Wednesday, July 13, 2011
EMPLOYMENT-JOBS, FILING UP OF VACANCIES, MUST, BY EMPLOYMENT AN THROUGH PAPER PUBLICATION NOTIFICATION INVITING APPLICATIONS FROM THE CANDIDATES.
The petitioners are unemployed persons belonging to Schedule Tribe. The Visakhapatnam port Trust proposed to engage 17 pool khalasies for providing intermittent work to them, by paying consolidated pay of Rs.5,500/-p.m. The further object was to explore the possibilities of inducting them into its service, as and when posts reserved for STs arise, after verification of the qualifications etc. with this object, the secretary of the Port Trust, the 2nd respondent herein, addressed a letter dated 24-4-2010 to employment Officer, Sub-Employment Exchange Paderu, Visakhapatnam District, the 3rd respondent, to sponsor the names of eligible candidates. The petitioners contended that, for one reasons or the other, they could not get themselves registered with the 3rd respondent and the Port trust cannot restrict the consideration, only to candidates sponsored by the r3rd respondent. Placing reliance upon the judgments rendered by the supreme Court they insist that heir cases also be considered. Subject to their holding the requisite qualifications. The question as to whether state or any organizations, established by can restrict the consideration only to candidate to be considered by employment exchange for the purpose of making appointments or whether they are under obligation to issue a general notification enabling all the qualified persons to apply was the subject matter of several judgment before the Hon’ble S.Court. the answer to this, however, was not uniform, and accordingly the litigation proliferated. After considering a series of judgment of High Court and Supreme Court on this issue, ultimately accepting the observations made in Visweshwara Rao’s case operate, without any hindrance. The principle as of now is universal in its application, irrespective of the content of the service rules of the organization. Hence the writ petition is allowed, and the respondents 1 and 2 shall issue public notification, inviting applications for the posts or positions, that have been notified through the Employment Exchange, and enable all the eligible candidates to apply.
Sunday, July 10, 2011
REGULARSIATION OF SERVICE FROM THE DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN APSRTC
The petitioners have been appointed by the respondent-Corporation through the process of regular selection, but were appointed on casual basis. The fact remains that their services were regularized on various dates. Their services were not regularized from the dates of appointment. The Division Bench in case, while adverting to this question held that the workmen are entitled for regularization of their services from the dates of their initial appointment to such post on completion of 240 working days. The petitioners, in my considered opinion, are entitled for the very same relief. The respondents are consequently directed to consider the cases of the petitioners for regularization and such regularization shall have to be done by the respondents in a phased manner. The petitioners have to wait for their turn and chance for such regularization in the phased manner and in terms of the directions of the Division Bench. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition the required details with regard to each of the petitioner is not furnished and, therefore, it is not possible for this Court to issue any positive direction as to with effect from what date the services of the petitioners have to be regularized. The respondents are directed to examine the case of the each petitioner and comply with the directions by regularizing their services in a phased manner with reference to completion of 240 working days by each of the petitioner. It is, however, declared that the petitioners are not entitled for any arrears or back wages on account of Regularization.
Saturday, July 9, 2011
GRANTED ALL SERVICE BENEFITS EXCEPT HALF THE BACK WAGES BY SETTING-ASIDE THE REMOVAL ORDER OF APSRTC.
The petitioner was a Driver in the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC) and unauthorized absent from duty on different spells. During two spells, one spell he was admitted in government he had taken treatment for hypertension and hear disease and the same, he had sent intimation through his neighbour, his neighbour did not intimate the first respondent-apsrtc. Secondly spell, again he admitted in hospital as he was suffering from jaundice. Thereafter he was allowed to join duty and issued charge sheet dt. 29-8-1991, alleging that the petitioner was un-authorisedly absent from 3-8-1991 to 29-1991 without intimation or prior sanction of leave, which is a mis-conduct as per the regulations of APSRTC. An E.O. was appointed and conducted an enquiry for first charge but not conducted second charge. Ultimately an order of removal of the petitioner from service passed. The said order was challenged before the Industrial Tribunal. The petitioner was un-authorisedly absent that the domestic enquiry was not initiated and that the charges have been proved. An award was passed under section 11 of the I.D.Act. by the Tribunal and directed the first respondent to reinstate the petitioner into service as a fresh candidate as Driver without continuity of service and attendant benefits. Quashing the award of the labour Court he filed a W.P. before the Hon’ble High court to call for records relating to the I.D. A reading of the entire material given an impression that an impression that it is a fact that the petitioner was admitted in government hospital from the said dates and to that effect he submitted medical certificates also. It is clear that he was unable to report the matter to the concerned authority and the was failed to note the court below and when he is unable to move from the bed and when there is not evident to show that there are other family members who are fit to report the matter to authorities for non intimation about the admission in hospital by an employee at the time of his admission can not be treated as a grave misconduct and for treat simple mistake, denying the continuity of service and the entire back wages amount to gross disproportionate to the proved misconduct. Therefore the award requires to be modified as prayed for by the petitioner. Of course, taking into consideration the mistake committed by the petitioner in not intimating to the first respondent ultimately the High Court consider it just and reasonable to held that impugned award to the extent of holding that the petitioner in not entitled to continuity of service and full back wages is set aside and the award stands modified as follows. The petitioner shall be reinstated into service with continuity of service, but in the circumstances, half of the back wages and all other attendant benefits.
Wednesday, July 6, 2011
SALE IS INVALID TEMPLE LAND
The Temple land sold by Manager of Temple to Appellant-Association with sanction of commissioner of Endowments and with permission of Government. To sell the same by private negotiations without publicauction. No reasons were assigned by the government for grant of permission. As per order of the Government the Commissioner acted in flagrant violation of mandatory provisions of Sec.74 and 105 and Rule 26 of the Rules made under of A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 in accordingsanction. Hence there is no Sanction at all in the eye of law. The said Sale held is null and void. The orders passed by Commissioner and Government without following relevant mandatory provisions and Rules is bad in law. No relief need be prayed for setting aside such orders. Suit filed in civil court by Trustees of the Temple for cancellation of sale deed and for recovery of possession of land without seeking relief for setting aside orders of Commissioner and Government is Maintainable. Provisions of Sec. 105 not a bar for filing such a suit. Hence Sale of temple property inThis case is null and void. It is not mere irregularity which can be cured by providing some compensation. Full Bench judgment.
Tuesday, July 5, 2011
NOT WASTE LAND
Sec. 2-A and 7 of A.P.(A.A) Inmas (Abolition and conversion into Ryotwari) Act,1956 ‘ Waste Land term should be interpreted as Land which are unfit for cultivation for ever ’ and not lands which are fit for cultivation or which should be brought under cultivation without incurring much expenditure. Merely because lands are not under actual cultivation on the of Act, they cannot be treated as waste land. Lands I n question fur for cultivation and authorities s proposed to assign same to third parties for purpose of cultivation. Held when once it is found that land is fit for cultivation, it cannot be treated as waste land so as to vest the same in government interms of section 2 - A of the Act.
Monday, July 4, 2011
APSRTC, PETITIONER THOUGH NOT ON DUTY ENTITLED TO GET ALTERNATE JOB.
The petitioner, he joined the service in APSRTC on 1.10.1983 and while he was working as Driver in Banswada Depot on 2.7.1996 he commenced his duty at 1-30 p.m., and completed on the next day i.e., 3.7.1996 at 11.30 a.m. On account of the Naxal bund, he was forced to stay at Banswada on 3.7.1996 and immediately thereafter, on information that his father was serious and was admitted in hospital at Bodhan, he left Banswada by RTC Bus No. AEZ-4900. Due to his misfortune, the bus in which he was travelling, met with an accident, on account of which he was seriously injured and subsequently his right leg was amputated in the Osmania General Hospital. According to him, he was treated as inpatient in Osmania Hospital till 15.2.1997. Subsequently, he was referred to Tarnaka Hospital by APSRTC authorities. The Medical Officer of Taranaka Hospital issued Medical Certificate dated 7.3.1997 opining that he is unfit for Al category driver due to amputation of his leg. Basing on the said certificate, the 1st respondent i.e., the Depot Manager, APSRTC by his proceedings dated 10.3.1997 kept him under forced leave until further orders and subsequently the 1st respondent by proceedings dated 17-4-1998 retired him from service on medical ground with effect from 17.4.1998. The grievance of the petitioner is that though he is not fit to hold the post of A-1 category (driver), the APSRTC authorities ought to have accommodated him in some other post in the depot by providing alternative employment, instead the respondents have chosen to retire him voluntarily, which is not only illegal and unjust but also it deprived him of his bread.
3. A counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondents stating that the petitioner at the relevant point of time was not on duty as he has completed his duty by 11.30 a.m., on 3.7.1996, whereas the accident took place at 9.30 p.m., on 3.7.1996. Had the accident occurred during the course of service, the respondents are under obligation to provide him alternate employment. As per the Medical Certificate, the petitioner is not fit to work as driver and the order retiring him voluntarily from service is not illegal.
The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has drawn my attention to Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (for short 'the Act'). According to him, the word 'during his service' used under Section 47 does not mean that at the relevant point of time when the accident occurred the employee shall be in service. It is sufficient if it is established that he is working with the organization and he is in service it automatically attracts Section 47 of the Act.
6. On the contrary, the learned Standing Counsel for respondents vehemently opposed the said submissions stating that the word "during his service" shall be interpreted in such a manner that the employee shall be in service at the time when the accident occurred and in such case only he is entitled for alternative employment but not in each and every case. The learned Counsel farther submits that may be it is a fact that he was working as a driver with the APSRTC but it does not mean that he is entitled for alternate accommodation, although a major accident occurred and the petitioner's leg was amputated.
7. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, it is necessary to extract Section 47 of the Act.
Non-discrimination in Government employment :--(1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service :
Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits;
Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.
8. The above provision of law is an enabling provision to provide alternate employment in the event an employee acquiring some disability during the course of service. The word "during his service" in my considered view shall not be interpreted in a narrow compass that at the relevant point of time the employee shall be in actual service. It is suffice if the employee is on the rolls of the organization when he met with an accident at the relevant point of time. The organization has a duty to create alternate employment as per Section 47 of the Act. In fact, Section 47 of the Act makes it clear that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. The contention of the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents that though the petitioner retired from service on medical grounds, his name still exists in the list of unfit drivers entitled for alternative post of cleaner is not tenable. This view of mine is fortified by catena of decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court. The Apex Court in Kunal Singh v. Union of India,
"(9) Chapter VI of the Act deals with employment relating to persons with disabilities, who are yet to secure employment. Section 47, when falls in Chapter VIII, deals with an employee, who is already in service and acquires a disability during his service. It must be born in mind that Section 2 of the Act has given distinct and different definitions of "disability" and "person with disability". It is well settled that in the same enactment if two distinct definitions are given defining a word/expression, they must be understood accordingly in terms of the definition. It must be remembered that person does not acquire or suffer disability by choice. Ah employee, who acquires disability during his service, is sought to be protected under Section 47 of the Act specifically. Such employee, acquiring disability, if not protected, would not only suffer himself, but possibly all those who depend on him would also suffer. The very frame and contents of Section 47 clearly indicate its mandatory nature. The very opening part of Section reads "no establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service". The section further provides that if an employee after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits; if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post he will be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation whichever is earlier. Added to this no promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability as is evident from Sub-section (2) of Section 47. Section 47 contains a clear directive that the employer shall not dispense with or reduce in rank an employee who acquires a disability during the service. In construing a provision of social beneficial enactment that too dealing with disabled persons intended to give them equal opportunities, protection of rights and full participation, the view that advances the object of the Act and serves its purpose must be preferred to the one which obstructs the object and paralyses the purpose of the Act. Language of Section 47 is plain and certain casting statutory obligation on the employer to protect an employee acquiring disability during service."
(10) The argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent on the basis of definition given in Section 2(t) of the Act that benefit of Section 47 is not available to the appellant, as he has suffered permanent invalidity cannot be accepted. Because, the appellant was an employee, who has acquired "disability" within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Act and not a person with disability.
(12) Merely because under Rule 38 of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, the appellant got invalidity pension is no ground to deny the protection, mandatory made available to the appellant under Section 47of the Act. Once it is held that the appellant has acquired disability during his service and if found not suitable for the post he was holding, he could be shifted to some other post with same pay scale" and service benefits; if it was not possible to adjust him against any post, he could be kept on a supernumerary post until suitable post was available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. It appears no such efforts were made by the respondents. They have proceeded to hold that he was permanently incapacitated to continue in service without considering the effect of other provision of Section 47 of the Act.
9. Similar view was taken by a learned Single Judge of this Court
"(10) The 1st respondent Company is a company established as well as owned by the Government and it is not in dispute as to the application of the provisions to the 1st respondent establishment. Further, from the provisions of Section 47 it is also clear that no establishment shall dispense with or reduce in rank an employee who acquires a disability during his service. If an employee after acquiring the disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, he could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits. It is also provided that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation. Further, under Sub-section (2), no promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of disability. Under the proviso to said Section, however, the Government is empowered to grant exemption by notification subject to such conditions, if any, to any establishment from the provision of this Act. But, it is not the case of the 1st respondent Company that it was given any exemption, though in the counter it was stated that the 1st respondent Company has applied to the State Government for grant of exemption. As long as no such exemption was granted to the 1st respondent Company it is under an obligation to comply the provisions of the Act.
(12) A perusal of the provisions of the Act does not contemplate that in order to get the benefit of the provisions of the Act that any authority notified under the Act has to certify. On the other hand, the Memo filed by the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent shows that even in the case of recruitment the certificates issued by the Medical Officers have to be taken into consideration and whenever there is a dispute as to the genuineness of the claim then only the issue has to be referred to the State Appellate Medical Board Authority. In the present case, admittedly, the Medical Board of the 1st respondent Company, after conducting necessary tests and verifications, declared that both the petitioners are medically unfit, to carry on the job, which they were carrying on as on the date of the accident. When once the Officers of the respondent Company declared that the petitioners became disabled as a result of the injuries suffered by them, basing on which their services were terminated, it is not open to the 1st respondent Company to contend that they are not disabled and it should be certified by the medical authorities notified by the State Government under the provisions of the Act."
10. In the light of the foregoing discussion, coupled with the precedents, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the petitioner was in service at the relevant point of time i.e., on the date when the accident took place and accordingly he is entitled to the benefits provided for under Section 47 of the Act.
11. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 17.4.1998 is hereby set aside and the respondents are directed to strictly adhere to Section 47 of the Act and provide alternate employment to which he is suitable. This exercise shall be done within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. It is made clear that the petitioner is entitled to all consequential benefits to which he is entitled as per law. No Costs.
3. A counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondents stating that the petitioner at the relevant point of time was not on duty as he has completed his duty by 11.30 a.m., on 3.7.1996, whereas the accident took place at 9.30 p.m., on 3.7.1996. Had the accident occurred during the course of service, the respondents are under obligation to provide him alternate employment. As per the Medical Certificate, the petitioner is not fit to work as driver and the order retiring him voluntarily from service is not illegal.
The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has drawn my attention to Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (for short 'the Act'). According to him, the word 'during his service' used under Section 47 does not mean that at the relevant point of time when the accident occurred the employee shall be in service. It is sufficient if it is established that he is working with the organization and he is in service it automatically attracts Section 47 of the Act.
6. On the contrary, the learned Standing Counsel for respondents vehemently opposed the said submissions stating that the word "during his service" shall be interpreted in such a manner that the employee shall be in service at the time when the accident occurred and in such case only he is entitled for alternative employment but not in each and every case. The learned Counsel farther submits that may be it is a fact that he was working as a driver with the APSRTC but it does not mean that he is entitled for alternate accommodation, although a major accident occurred and the petitioner's leg was amputated.
7. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, it is necessary to extract Section 47 of the Act.
Non-discrimination in Government employment :--(1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service :
Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits;
Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.
8. The above provision of law is an enabling provision to provide alternate employment in the event an employee acquiring some disability during the course of service. The word "during his service" in my considered view shall not be interpreted in a narrow compass that at the relevant point of time the employee shall be in actual service. It is suffice if the employee is on the rolls of the organization when he met with an accident at the relevant point of time. The organization has a duty to create alternate employment as per Section 47 of the Act. In fact, Section 47 of the Act makes it clear that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. The contention of the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents that though the petitioner retired from service on medical grounds, his name still exists in the list of unfit drivers entitled for alternative post of cleaner is not tenable. This view of mine is fortified by catena of decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court. The Apex Court in Kunal Singh v. Union of India,
"(9) Chapter VI of the Act deals with employment relating to persons with disabilities, who are yet to secure employment. Section 47, when falls in Chapter VIII, deals with an employee, who is already in service and acquires a disability during his service. It must be born in mind that Section 2 of the Act has given distinct and different definitions of "disability" and "person with disability". It is well settled that in the same enactment if two distinct definitions are given defining a word/expression, they must be understood accordingly in terms of the definition. It must be remembered that person does not acquire or suffer disability by choice. Ah employee, who acquires disability during his service, is sought to be protected under Section 47 of the Act specifically. Such employee, acquiring disability, if not protected, would not only suffer himself, but possibly all those who depend on him would also suffer. The very frame and contents of Section 47 clearly indicate its mandatory nature. The very opening part of Section reads "no establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service". The section further provides that if an employee after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits; if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post he will be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation whichever is earlier. Added to this no promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability as is evident from Sub-section (2) of Section 47. Section 47 contains a clear directive that the employer shall not dispense with or reduce in rank an employee who acquires a disability during the service. In construing a provision of social beneficial enactment that too dealing with disabled persons intended to give them equal opportunities, protection of rights and full participation, the view that advances the object of the Act and serves its purpose must be preferred to the one which obstructs the object and paralyses the purpose of the Act. Language of Section 47 is plain and certain casting statutory obligation on the employer to protect an employee acquiring disability during service."
(10) The argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent on the basis of definition given in Section 2(t) of the Act that benefit of Section 47 is not available to the appellant, as he has suffered permanent invalidity cannot be accepted. Because, the appellant was an employee, who has acquired "disability" within the meaning of Section 2(i) of the Act and not a person with disability.
(12) Merely because under Rule 38 of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, the appellant got invalidity pension is no ground to deny the protection, mandatory made available to the appellant under Section 47of the Act. Once it is held that the appellant has acquired disability during his service and if found not suitable for the post he was holding, he could be shifted to some other post with same pay scale" and service benefits; if it was not possible to adjust him against any post, he could be kept on a supernumerary post until suitable post was available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. It appears no such efforts were made by the respondents. They have proceeded to hold that he was permanently incapacitated to continue in service without considering the effect of other provision of Section 47 of the Act.
9. Similar view was taken by a learned Single Judge of this Court
"(10) The 1st respondent Company is a company established as well as owned by the Government and it is not in dispute as to the application of the provisions to the 1st respondent establishment. Further, from the provisions of Section 47 it is also clear that no establishment shall dispense with or reduce in rank an employee who acquires a disability during his service. If an employee after acquiring the disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, he could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits. It is also provided that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation. Further, under Sub-section (2), no promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of disability. Under the proviso to said Section, however, the Government is empowered to grant exemption by notification subject to such conditions, if any, to any establishment from the provision of this Act. But, it is not the case of the 1st respondent Company that it was given any exemption, though in the counter it was stated that the 1st respondent Company has applied to the State Government for grant of exemption. As long as no such exemption was granted to the 1st respondent Company it is under an obligation to comply the provisions of the Act.
(12) A perusal of the provisions of the Act does not contemplate that in order to get the benefit of the provisions of the Act that any authority notified under the Act has to certify. On the other hand, the Memo filed by the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent shows that even in the case of recruitment the certificates issued by the Medical Officers have to be taken into consideration and whenever there is a dispute as to the genuineness of the claim then only the issue has to be referred to the State Appellate Medical Board Authority. In the present case, admittedly, the Medical Board of the 1st respondent Company, after conducting necessary tests and verifications, declared that both the petitioners are medically unfit, to carry on the job, which they were carrying on as on the date of the accident. When once the Officers of the respondent Company declared that the petitioners became disabled as a result of the injuries suffered by them, basing on which their services were terminated, it is not open to the 1st respondent Company to contend that they are not disabled and it should be certified by the medical authorities notified by the State Government under the provisions of the Act."
10. In the light of the foregoing discussion, coupled with the precedents, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the petitioner was in service at the relevant point of time i.e., on the date when the accident took place and accordingly he is entitled to the benefits provided for under Section 47 of the Act.
11. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 17.4.1998 is hereby set aside and the respondents are directed to strictly adhere to Section 47 of the Act and provide alternate employment to which he is suitable. This exercise shall be done within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. It is made clear that the petitioner is entitled to all consequential benefits to which he is entitled as per law. No Costs.
APSRTC MISCONDUCT — POLITICAL ACTIVITY
The petitioner, Senior Store Supervisor of Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, at Vijayawada contested, on 1- 12-82, as a candidate on behalf of the Communist Party of India at the General Elections as a Member of the Legislative Assembly. An inquiry was conducted on a charge that he thereby contravened Regulation 23(1) of the APSRTC Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1963 and Note 2(xv) to Regulation 9(1) of the APSRTC Employees (CCA) Regulations, 1967 and the petitioner was removed from service by order dated 31-10-84 and it was confirmed in appeal.Regulation 23(1) of the Conduct Rules prescribes that no employee shall be a member of any political party or take active part in politics or in political demonstrations. Regulation 28(xxxii) provides that violation of the Regulation or instructions of the Corporation is a misconduct. Note (2)(xv) to Regulation 9(1) of the CCA Regulations says that taking part in subversive or political activities or activities prohibited by law or made punishable by law or other activities prejudicial to the interests of the Corporation constitutes serious misconduct. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that the Conduct Regulations prescribe prohibition in political activities or contest at an election while being a member of the Service, and it is a reasonable restriction and a valid classification of the entire class of employees of the Corporation, and is within the power of the Corporation and is valid. The High Court accordingly dismissed the writ petition.
APSRTC, DIRECTED TO PAY ADDITIONAL MONETARY BENEFITS TO PETITIONER
The petitioner, who joined the service of the respondents-Corporation as Driver in 1974, applied for retirement on 21.10.2003 due to defective vision, and he was retired from service on 27.10.2003. Before he retired from service, the respondents issued notification in PD No. 14/2003, dated 08.10.2003, informing that the Board vide Resolution No. 128/2003, dated 28.07.2003, has accorded approval for amending Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the APSRTC Employees (Service) Regulations, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Regulations'), and notified the amendment, which provided better benefits to medical unfit Drivers. In terms of the above amended Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations, the petitioner states that he took retirement and applied for grant of additional monetary benefits in lieu of alternative employment, as provided under Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, but the respondents did not pay the additional monetary benefits. The petitioner states that the respondents issued another Circular in PD No. 40/2005, dated 26.08.2005, after obtaining approval from the Government, reiterating the benefits payable under notification in PD No. 14/2003, dated 08.10.2003. While so, the 2nd respondent, namely the Regional Manager, on the clarification sought by the 2nd respondent, namely the Depot Manager, whether additional monetary benefits can be paid to the petitioner, vide proceedings dated 10.07.2006, informed that the petitioner cannot be paid the additional monetary benefits as he was found medically unfit on 07.10.2003 i.e. a day before the amended Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations, came into force i.e. 08.10.2003. Assailing these proceedings, the petitioner filed this writ petition.
Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents-APSRTC.
The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that though the petitioner was medically invalidated on 07.10.2003, he having been retired from service w.e.f. 27.10.2003, long after the amended Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations coming into force i.e. from 08.10.2003, is entitled to be granted the additional monetary benefits, and the action of the respondents in rejecting his case for grant of additional monetary benefits on the ground that he was found medically unfit on 07.10.2003 i.e. a day before the amended Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations came into force i.e. on 08.10.2003, is illegal and arbitrary, and more so when the amended Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations, which provided for grant of additional monetary benefits, came to be approved by the Government with effect from 08.10.2003. He, thus prayed that the impugned order be set aside and the writ petition be allowed.
The respondents filed counter. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondents-APSRTC reiterating the stand taken by the respondents in their counter submitted the amended
Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations came into force from 08.10.2003. Though the petitioner was retired from service on 27.10.2003, i.e. twenty days after notifying the amendment on 27.10.2003, the fact remains, he was found medically unfit on 07.10.2003, and having regard to the fact that the amendment came into effect from 08.10.2003, i.e. a day after the petitioner was found medically unfit, he was not given the benefit, and no exception can be taken to the impugned proceedings, which informed that the petitioner is not entitled to the additional monetary benefits.
In the background of the pleadings of the respective parties, the only short question that falls for consideration in this writ petition is whether the benefit of the amended Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations, which provided for grant of additional monetary benefits, to employees who are to be retired on being found medically unfit, is extendable to those employees who are found to be medically unfit from the day it came into force i.e. from 08.10.2003 or is not extendable to those who were found medically unfit much before its issuance, but retired from service after its issuance?
The petitioner, admittedly, was found medically unfit on 07.10.2003. A day after the petitioner was found medically unfit, the 1st respondent issued notification in PD No. 14/2003, dated 08.10.2003, notifying that the Board vide its Resolution
No. 128/2003, dated 28.07.2003, has accorded approval for implementation of the amended Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations, with immediate effect, pending sanction of the Government. The Government through its Principal Secretary in the TR & B Department, vide Letter No. 11073/Tr.II(2)/2003-4, dated 24.06.2005, accorded approval for the amended
Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations w.e.f. 08.10.2003. The respondents also vide Circular issued in PD No. 40/2005, dated 26.08.2005, reiterated that the Government has approved the amendment to Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations w.e.f. 08.10.2003. Thus, it is clear that the amended Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations has come into force from 08.10.2003. Though the petitioner was found medically unfit on 07.10.2003, i.e. a day before the amendment came into force, the fact remains, the petitioner applied for retirement on medical grounds on 21.10.2003, and his request having been accepted, he was retired from service on 27.10.2003. Inasmuch as the petitioner, who was found medically unfit on 07.10.2003, was retired from service from 27.10.2003, i.e. much after the amendment came into force from 08.10.2003, the respondents cannot be allowed to contend that the amendment, which provided for payment of additional benefits to those employees who are retired on medical grounds, is applicable only to those employees, who are found medically unfit from the day the amendment came to be notified i.e. 08.10.1003.
In the matter of settlement of benefits to an employee on his retirement, the respondents cannot dispute the fact that the employee who is retired, is entitled to claim all the benefits, which he is entitled to under the different circulars, which were or are in force as on the date of his retirement. It is not the day on which an employee is found medically unfit, but the day on which he is retired from service on being found medically unfit is important. Since the petitioner was in the employment of the respondents on 08.10.2003 on the day when the amended Regulation came into force, and was retired from service much after the said date on 27.10.2003, the respondents cannot be allowed to say that the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of the amended Regulation because he was found medically unfit a day before the amendment came into force. In that view of the matter, the proceedings dated 10.07.2003 of the Personnel Officer, working in the office of the 2nd respondent, namely the Regional Manager, informing the 3rd respondent, namely the Depot Manager, that the petitioner having been found medically unfit on 07.10.2003 i.e. a day before the amendment was notified on 08.10.2003, is not entitled to the benefit of the amendment, which provided for payment of additional monetary benefits in lieu of alternative employment, to employees who are found medically unfit, cannot be sustained, and is accordingly quashed.
Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The respondents are in terms of Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations are directed to pay the additional monetary benefits to the petitioner in lieu of alternative employment, as mandated under Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.
Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents-APSRTC.
The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that though the petitioner was medically invalidated on 07.10.2003, he having been retired from service w.e.f. 27.10.2003, long after the amended Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations coming into force i.e. from 08.10.2003, is entitled to be granted the additional monetary benefits, and the action of the respondents in rejecting his case for grant of additional monetary benefits on the ground that he was found medically unfit on 07.10.2003 i.e. a day before the amended Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations came into force i.e. on 08.10.2003, is illegal and arbitrary, and more so when the amended Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations, which provided for grant of additional monetary benefits, came to be approved by the Government with effect from 08.10.2003. He, thus prayed that the impugned order be set aside and the writ petition be allowed.
The respondents filed counter. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondents-APSRTC reiterating the stand taken by the respondents in their counter submitted the amended
Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations came into force from 08.10.2003. Though the petitioner was retired from service on 27.10.2003, i.e. twenty days after notifying the amendment on 27.10.2003, the fact remains, he was found medically unfit on 07.10.2003, and having regard to the fact that the amendment came into effect from 08.10.2003, i.e. a day after the petitioner was found medically unfit, he was not given the benefit, and no exception can be taken to the impugned proceedings, which informed that the petitioner is not entitled to the additional monetary benefits.
In the background of the pleadings of the respective parties, the only short question that falls for consideration in this writ petition is whether the benefit of the amended Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations, which provided for grant of additional monetary benefits, to employees who are to be retired on being found medically unfit, is extendable to those employees who are found to be medically unfit from the day it came into force i.e. from 08.10.2003 or is not extendable to those who were found medically unfit much before its issuance, but retired from service after its issuance?
The petitioner, admittedly, was found medically unfit on 07.10.2003. A day after the petitioner was found medically unfit, the 1st respondent issued notification in PD No. 14/2003, dated 08.10.2003, notifying that the Board vide its Resolution
No. 128/2003, dated 28.07.2003, has accorded approval for implementation of the amended Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations, with immediate effect, pending sanction of the Government. The Government through its Principal Secretary in the TR & B Department, vide Letter No. 11073/Tr.II(2)/2003-4, dated 24.06.2005, accorded approval for the amended
Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations w.e.f. 08.10.2003. The respondents also vide Circular issued in PD No. 40/2005, dated 26.08.2005, reiterated that the Government has approved the amendment to Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations w.e.f. 08.10.2003. Thus, it is clear that the amended Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations has come into force from 08.10.2003. Though the petitioner was found medically unfit on 07.10.2003, i.e. a day before the amendment came into force, the fact remains, the petitioner applied for retirement on medical grounds on 21.10.2003, and his request having been accepted, he was retired from service on 27.10.2003. Inasmuch as the petitioner, who was found medically unfit on 07.10.2003, was retired from service from 27.10.2003, i.e. much after the amendment came into force from 08.10.2003, the respondents cannot be allowed to contend that the amendment, which provided for payment of additional benefits to those employees who are retired on medical grounds, is applicable only to those employees, who are found medically unfit from the day the amendment came to be notified i.e. 08.10.1003.
In the matter of settlement of benefits to an employee on his retirement, the respondents cannot dispute the fact that the employee who is retired, is entitled to claim all the benefits, which he is entitled to under the different circulars, which were or are in force as on the date of his retirement. It is not the day on which an employee is found medically unfit, but the day on which he is retired from service on being found medically unfit is important. Since the petitioner was in the employment of the respondents on 08.10.2003 on the day when the amended Regulation came into force, and was retired from service much after the said date on 27.10.2003, the respondents cannot be allowed to say that the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of the amended Regulation because he was found medically unfit a day before the amendment came into force. In that view of the matter, the proceedings dated 10.07.2003 of the Personnel Officer, working in the office of the 2nd respondent, namely the Regional Manager, informing the 3rd respondent, namely the Depot Manager, that the petitioner having been found medically unfit on 07.10.2003 i.e. a day before the amendment was notified on 08.10.2003, is not entitled to the benefit of the amendment, which provided for payment of additional monetary benefits in lieu of alternative employment, to employees who are found medically unfit, cannot be sustained, and is accordingly quashed.
Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The respondents are in terms of Regulation 6A(5)(b) of the Regulations are directed to pay the additional monetary benefits to the petitioner in lieu of alternative employment, as mandated under Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.
APSRTC, TO PAY HIM ADDITIONAL MONETARY BENEFITS, IN LIEU OF ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT, AS PER CIRCULAR NO. PD-40/2005,
The petitioner, while serving the Corporation as a conductor, had retired from service on the basis of a medical certificate issued by the medical officer on 05.07.2005, declaring him unfit for being continued in service as a conductor. Hence, the writ petitioner had to be retired from service on 16.07.2005, much before he attained the age of superannuation prescribed by the Corporation. The writ petitioner, therefore, claimed certain additional monetary benefits in lieu of alternative employment. He draws inspiration for staking a claim for this additional monetary benefits on Circular No. PD- 40/2005, dated 26.08.2005, issued by the Corporation.
The Corporation framed Regulations called & quote APSRTC Employees' (Service) Regulations, 1964, (henceforth referred to as 'the Regulations') with the previous sanction of the Government of Andhra Pradesh, in terms of Section 45(1) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. These Regulations have been amended pursuant to Resolution No. 172 of 1968 passed by the Corporation on 06.08.1968, introducing a new Regulation called 6A dealing with the right of the Corporation to retire an employee due to his failure to conform to the requisite standards of physical fitness. Clause (1) of the newly incorporated Regulation 6A empowers and authorizes the Corporation to require any employee to undergo medical examination by a medical officer appointed or nominated by it, at such times or at such intervals as may be deemed necessary by it. Clause (4) thereof further empowers the Corporation to retire any such employee from service on medical grounds, if, in the opinion of the medical officer, the employee is found unfit to discharge the duties of the post held by him. Clause (4) has also incorporated a provision for the medically unfit employee to roll back to a post held by him previously by way of voluntary reversion, provided he possesses the necessary standards of medical fitness to hold such a previous post. Clause (5) of Regulation 6A provided for certain additional terminal benefits to such of those employees, who are retired on medical grounds. This Clause (5) of Regulation 6A had been amended by the Corporation by its Resolution No. 128 of 2003 passed on 28.07.2003. The amended Clause (5) of Regulation 6A has attempted to provide for additional monetary benefits for those retired on medical grounds by classifying the employees into two different segments; one being the drivers and the other, the rest of the employees other than the drivers. Sub-clauses (a) and (b) have been incorporated for the said purpose. Sub-clause (a) dealt with the cases of employees other than drivers, while sub- clause (b) dealt with the cases of drivers.
In the case of drivers, who have been retired on medical invalidation grounds, they are extended all terminal benefits apart from an ex gratia payment equivalent to 1 1/2 months emoluments (pay + D.A) last drawn, for each completed year of service or the monthly emoluments received by him at the time of such premature retirement on medical grounds multiplied by the balance months of service left for normal date of retirement, whichever is less. In other words, a driver, who is retired on medical grounds, is offered an additional monetary benefit in the form of ex gratia amount, which will be equivalent to 1 1/2 months of emoluments last drawn for each completed year of service or the last drawn wages multiplied by the reminder length of service left for normal retirement, whichever is less. This ex gratia payment is obviously intended to cover the cases of drivers only in recognition of the fact that by the very nature of their calling, the drivers are likely to fall on their medical fitness standards over a period of time, whereas, such a situation may not arise in case of other employees.
It is not very difficult to visualize a situation where a good number of drivers would be put to duties on such of the buses plied at night times. While driving the buses during night time, the drivers are required to focus greater attention on the road conditions as well as the vehicular traffic moving in the opposite direction. In the process, they get exposed to a constant and varying degrees of light intensity. Sometimes, from out of the pitch darkness, they get exposed to focused lighting of the vehicular traffic coming in the opposite direction. The intensity of the light therefore, keeps fluctuating and this factor can have an impact upon the standards of vision of drivers and hence, the management has recognized that drivers as a class are more prone for losing the standards of fitness required to be maintained by them much faster than the rest of the employees. Therefore, to my mind, classification of the employees of the Corporation into two different segments, one of drivers and the rest comprising the other employees, cannot be considered to be either discriminatory or arbitrary. There is a rational relationship attempted by the Corporation in devising this classification. The need to compensate additionally the drivers is obviously more acute than the necessity to compensate the rest of the employees, who all due to other factors than their very nature of calling may be prone for losing the standards of fitness. Therefore, the classification attempted by Resolution No. 128 of 2003 and granting additional monetary benefits in the form of ex gratia to the drivers cannot be treated as wholly unjust or impermissible.
Therefore, Resolution No. 128 of 2003 passed by the Board of the Corporation dealt with the cases of drivers exclusively for a better or favourable treatment enabling them to receive additional ex gratia amount, whereas the same was not extended in case of rest of the employees. In cases of rest of the employees, the employer's contribution to provident fund and payment of gratuity will be regulated as if the employee had put in five more years of service or the reminder of service up to the date of normal superannuation, whichever is less. They will also be paid wages for the reminder period of left over service up to the normal date of retirement adopting the different formulae, depending upon the length of reminder of service. We are not so much concerned with those formulae. Thus, Resolution No. 128 of 2003 of the Board clearly made a distinction between the employees other than the drivers and the drivers. As is required by Section 45 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, every resolution passed by the Board of Directors of the Corporation was to be approved by the State Government. Accordingly, proposals have been sent up by the Corporation to the State Government and the State Government, through their communication, dated 24.06.2005, of the Principal Secretary to the Government, Transport, Roads and Buildings Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, conveyed their approval for Board Resolution No. 128 of 2003. Hence, Circular No. PD-40/2005, dated 26.08.2005 has been issued by the Corporation advising all its pay disbursing/terminal benefits disbursing authorities to compute additional monetary benefits in accord with Clause (5) of Regulation 6A of the Regulations of the Corporation. Hence, Circular No. PD-40/2005, dated 26.08.2005 has not created any additional benefits than those contemplated and approved by the Board of the Corporation through their Resolution No. 128 of 2003.
As was already noticed supra, through Resolution No. 128 of 2003, an attempt has been made by the Corporation to divide, for the purpose of payment of additional monetary benefits to such of those employees, who have been retired on medical invalidation grounds, into two segments, one segment exclusively comprising drivers and the other segment dealing with rest of the employees than the drivers. Since the writ petitioner is a conductor, he is clearly not entitled to the additional monetary benefits sought to be conferred on drivers as ex gratia. The monetary benefit, which he is entitled to be conferred, has got to be calculated in terms of sub-clause (a) of Clause (5) of Regulation 6A only. If the writ petitioner has not been paid the said benefits so far, by the Corporation, the Corporation would do so immediately and settle the same in favour of the writ petitioner within a maximum period of 60 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, duly calculating the benefits and furnishing such a calculation sheet to the writ petitioner. However, if the benefits have already been paid to the petitioner, and if the writ petitioner seeks any clarification in that regard, the Corporation would do so by furnishing him a detailed calculation sheet as to how the monetary benefits payable to him in terms of sub-clause (a) of Clause (5) of Regulation 6A have been worked out. But for the above, the principal claim made by the writ petitioner for payment of exgratia benefit to him, at par with the case of drivers, is not sustainable
The Corporation framed Regulations called & quote APSRTC Employees' (Service) Regulations, 1964, (henceforth referred to as 'the Regulations') with the previous sanction of the Government of Andhra Pradesh, in terms of Section 45(1) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. These Regulations have been amended pursuant to Resolution No. 172 of 1968 passed by the Corporation on 06.08.1968, introducing a new Regulation called 6A dealing with the right of the Corporation to retire an employee due to his failure to conform to the requisite standards of physical fitness. Clause (1) of the newly incorporated Regulation 6A empowers and authorizes the Corporation to require any employee to undergo medical examination by a medical officer appointed or nominated by it, at such times or at such intervals as may be deemed necessary by it. Clause (4) thereof further empowers the Corporation to retire any such employee from service on medical grounds, if, in the opinion of the medical officer, the employee is found unfit to discharge the duties of the post held by him. Clause (4) has also incorporated a provision for the medically unfit employee to roll back to a post held by him previously by way of voluntary reversion, provided he possesses the necessary standards of medical fitness to hold such a previous post. Clause (5) of Regulation 6A provided for certain additional terminal benefits to such of those employees, who are retired on medical grounds. This Clause (5) of Regulation 6A had been amended by the Corporation by its Resolution No. 128 of 2003 passed on 28.07.2003. The amended Clause (5) of Regulation 6A has attempted to provide for additional monetary benefits for those retired on medical grounds by classifying the employees into two different segments; one being the drivers and the other, the rest of the employees other than the drivers. Sub-clauses (a) and (b) have been incorporated for the said purpose. Sub-clause (a) dealt with the cases of employees other than drivers, while sub- clause (b) dealt with the cases of drivers.
In the case of drivers, who have been retired on medical invalidation grounds, they are extended all terminal benefits apart from an ex gratia payment equivalent to 1 1/2 months emoluments (pay + D.A) last drawn, for each completed year of service or the monthly emoluments received by him at the time of such premature retirement on medical grounds multiplied by the balance months of service left for normal date of retirement, whichever is less. In other words, a driver, who is retired on medical grounds, is offered an additional monetary benefit in the form of ex gratia amount, which will be equivalent to 1 1/2 months of emoluments last drawn for each completed year of service or the last drawn wages multiplied by the reminder length of service left for normal retirement, whichever is less. This ex gratia payment is obviously intended to cover the cases of drivers only in recognition of the fact that by the very nature of their calling, the drivers are likely to fall on their medical fitness standards over a period of time, whereas, such a situation may not arise in case of other employees.
It is not very difficult to visualize a situation where a good number of drivers would be put to duties on such of the buses plied at night times. While driving the buses during night time, the drivers are required to focus greater attention on the road conditions as well as the vehicular traffic moving in the opposite direction. In the process, they get exposed to a constant and varying degrees of light intensity. Sometimes, from out of the pitch darkness, they get exposed to focused lighting of the vehicular traffic coming in the opposite direction. The intensity of the light therefore, keeps fluctuating and this factor can have an impact upon the standards of vision of drivers and hence, the management has recognized that drivers as a class are more prone for losing the standards of fitness required to be maintained by them much faster than the rest of the employees. Therefore, to my mind, classification of the employees of the Corporation into two different segments, one of drivers and the rest comprising the other employees, cannot be considered to be either discriminatory or arbitrary. There is a rational relationship attempted by the Corporation in devising this classification. The need to compensate additionally the drivers is obviously more acute than the necessity to compensate the rest of the employees, who all due to other factors than their very nature of calling may be prone for losing the standards of fitness. Therefore, the classification attempted by Resolution No. 128 of 2003 and granting additional monetary benefits in the form of ex gratia to the drivers cannot be treated as wholly unjust or impermissible.
Therefore, Resolution No. 128 of 2003 passed by the Board of the Corporation dealt with the cases of drivers exclusively for a better or favourable treatment enabling them to receive additional ex gratia amount, whereas the same was not extended in case of rest of the employees. In cases of rest of the employees, the employer's contribution to provident fund and payment of gratuity will be regulated as if the employee had put in five more years of service or the reminder of service up to the date of normal superannuation, whichever is less. They will also be paid wages for the reminder period of left over service up to the normal date of retirement adopting the different formulae, depending upon the length of reminder of service. We are not so much concerned with those formulae. Thus, Resolution No. 128 of 2003 of the Board clearly made a distinction between the employees other than the drivers and the drivers. As is required by Section 45 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, every resolution passed by the Board of Directors of the Corporation was to be approved by the State Government. Accordingly, proposals have been sent up by the Corporation to the State Government and the State Government, through their communication, dated 24.06.2005, of the Principal Secretary to the Government, Transport, Roads and Buildings Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, conveyed their approval for Board Resolution No. 128 of 2003. Hence, Circular No. PD-40/2005, dated 26.08.2005 has been issued by the Corporation advising all its pay disbursing/terminal benefits disbursing authorities to compute additional monetary benefits in accord with Clause (5) of Regulation 6A of the Regulations of the Corporation. Hence, Circular No. PD-40/2005, dated 26.08.2005 has not created any additional benefits than those contemplated and approved by the Board of the Corporation through their Resolution No. 128 of 2003.
As was already noticed supra, through Resolution No. 128 of 2003, an attempt has been made by the Corporation to divide, for the purpose of payment of additional monetary benefits to such of those employees, who have been retired on medical invalidation grounds, into two segments, one segment exclusively comprising drivers and the other segment dealing with rest of the employees than the drivers. Since the writ petitioner is a conductor, he is clearly not entitled to the additional monetary benefits sought to be conferred on drivers as ex gratia. The monetary benefit, which he is entitled to be conferred, has got to be calculated in terms of sub-clause (a) of Clause (5) of Regulation 6A only. If the writ petitioner has not been paid the said benefits so far, by the Corporation, the Corporation would do so immediately and settle the same in favour of the writ petitioner within a maximum period of 60 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, duly calculating the benefits and furnishing such a calculation sheet to the writ petitioner. However, if the benefits have already been paid to the petitioner, and if the writ petitioner seeks any clarification in that regard, the Corporation would do so by furnishing him a detailed calculation sheet as to how the monetary benefits payable to him in terms of sub-clause (a) of Clause (5) of Regulation 6A have been worked out. But for the above, the principal claim made by the writ petitioner for payment of exgratia benefit to him, at par with the case of drivers, is not sustainable
DENIAL OF ALTERNATE EMPLOYMENT BY THE ANDHRA PRADESH STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION
The petitioner, a Driver in the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC), met with an accident while returning home from duty on 03.01.2006. He was declared unfit to continue in the post of a Driver owing to the injuries and the disability which resulted from the accident. It is his case that he sought alternate employment in accordance with Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (for brevity, 'the Act of 1995'), as he had no other source of income and had to provide for his family including three school going daughters. He got issued legal notice dated 13.08.2007 to the APSRTC in this regard. While so, he received the APSRTC's letter dated 09.08.2007 on 29.08.2007 stating to the effect that his settlement amounts were ready for payment and calling upon him to attend the office and receive the same. He replied vide letter dated 31.08.2007 reiterating his request for alternate employment while disclaiming interest in receiving monetary benefits in lieu thereof. Aggrieved by the continued inaction of the APSRTC in this regard, he filed Writ Petition No.20058 of 2007 before this Court. By interim order dated 12.10.2007 passed therein, this Court directed the APSRTC to consider the petitioner's case as per Section 47 of the Act of 1995. Thereupon, the order dated 14.12.2007 was passed by the APSRTC. The APSRTC stated therein that the petitioner had willingly opted for retirement on medical grounds in the prescribed proforma in view of his health condition and that he was retired from service with effect from 27.10.2006 under proceedings dated 13.11.2006. In that view of the matter, the APSRTC decried the petitioner's eligibility for alternate employment under Section 47 of the Act of 1995. The petitioner was asked to approach the Depot Manager, Nizamabad Depot of the APSRTC for payment of additional monetary benefits.
In his response dated 13.01.2008, the petitioner again repeated that he was not interested in monetary benefits and was keen on being provided alternate employment. He disclaimed knowledge of the application dated 13.11.2006 said to have been submitted by him waiving his right to alternate employment in favour of additional monetary benefits. He specifically stated that the same was done keeping him in the dark and that he was never informed of the same. He again reiterated that he had no other source of income and had to provide for his family including three school going children.
Challenging the proceedings dated 13.11.2006 retiring him from service with effect from 27.10.2006 and the order dated 14.12.2007 rejecting his request for alternate employment, the petitioner filed the present case. In its counter, the APSRTC stated that the petitioner's accident did not occur during the course of his employment but thereafter, he was found unfit to continue in service as a Driver. Reference was made to the APSRTC's Circular dated 26.08.2005 whereby a Driver could opt for retirement on medical grounds in view of ill-health. The APSRTC stated that the petitioner submitted his option in Annexure-A on 20.07.2006 seeking to retire on medical grounds and accepting the offer of additional monetary benefits. It contended that as the petitioner voluntarily submitted his option for retirement on medical grounds choosing payment of admissible additional monetary benefits, he could not seek alternate employment as per Section 47 of the Act of 1995. The APSRTC therefore sought to support its order dated 14.12.2007.
In his reply, the petitioner reaffirmed that he never submitted a letter seeking voluntary retirement and that he was not explained anything while obtaining his signatures. He pointed out that he made many representations but nothing had been informed to him and that, in any event, he had not received any additional monetary benefits. He therefore assailed the action of the APSRTC in denying him alternate employment stating that the same was arbitrary and in violation of the statutory and constitutional protections afforded to him. Heard Sri V.Narsimha Goud, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri C.Sunil Kumar Reddy, learned standing counsel for the APSRTC.
The issue that falls for consideration is whether the APSRTC's action in denying alternate employment to the petitioner is valid and lawful in the light of Section 47 of the Act of 1995.
Section 47 of the Act of 1995, to the extent relevant, reads as under: "47. Non-discrimination in Government employments:- (1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service;
Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefit:
Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier."
There is no dispute that the APSRTC is covered by the Act of 1995 being an establishment as defined in Section 2(k) thereof [SYED MUSEBULLA ALI v. SECRETARY, GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS1 and MD.JANI MIYA v. APSRTC2].
The import of Section 47 of the Act of 1995 was considered by the Supreme Court in KUNAL SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA3. The observations of the Supreme Court in this regard are apposite:
"9. Chapter VI of the Act deals with employment relating to persons with disabilities, who are yet to secure employment. Section 47, which falls in Chapter VIII, deals with an employee, who is already in service and acquires a disability during his service. It must be borne in mind that Section 2 of the Act has given distinct and different definitions of "disability" and "person with disability". It is well settled that in the same enactment if two distinct definitions are given defining a word/expression, they must be understood accordingly in terms of the definition. It must be remembered that a person does not acquire or suffer disability by choice. An employee, who acquires disability during his service, is sought to be protected under Section 47 of the Act specifically. Such employee, acquiring disability, if not protected, would not only suffer himself, but possibly all those who depend on him would also suffer. The very frame and contents of Section 47 clearly indicate its mandatory nature. The very opening part of the section reads "no establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service". The section further provides that if an employee after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits; if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post he will be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. Added to this no promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability as is evident from sub-section (2) of Section 47. Section 47 contains a clear directive that the employer shall not dispense with or reduce in rank an employee who acquires a disability during the service. In construing a provision of a social beneficial enactment that too dealing with disabled persons intended to give them equal opportunities, protection of rights and full participation, the view that advances the object of the Act and serves its purpose must be preferred to the one which obstructs the object and paralyses the purpose of the Act. Language of Section 47 is plain and certain casting statutory obligation on the employer to protect an employee acquiring disability during service."
Thus, the clear language of Section 47(1) and the interpretation thereof by the Supreme Court as reflected supra leave no room for doubt that the APSRTC is under a statutory obligation not to dispense with an employee who acquires a disability during his service.
Sri C.Sunil Kumar Reddy, learned standing counsel, argued that as the accident due to which the petitioner sustained disability was not in the course of his employment, the Act of 1995 would have no application. This argument does not hold water. The perspicuous wording of Section 47 indicates that any disability acquired by an employee 'during his service' would bring him within the protective umbrella of the said provision and it is not necessary that the disability should be a direct consequence of or be connected to his employment. In any event, this issue is no longer res integra. In SK. MOULANA v. DEPOT MANAGER, APSRTC, BANSWADA DEPOT, NIZAMABAD DISTRICT4, a learned Judge of this Court while dealing with a similar contention observed:
"8. The above provision of law is an enabling provision to provide alternate employment in the event of an employee acquiring some disability during the course of service. The words "during his service" in my considered view shall not be interpreted in a narrow compass that at the relevant point of time the employee shall be in actual service. It is sufficient if the employee is on the rolls of the organization when he met with an accident at the relevant point of time. The organization has a duty to create alternate employment as per Section 47 of the Act. In fact, Section 47 of the Act makes it clear that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier."
Again in M.V.RAMANA RAO v. APSRTC5, a learned Judge of this Court dealing with a similar contention observed:
"......... the words 'disability during the course of service' as mentioned in Section 47 of the said Act has to be construed meaningfully keeping the objectives of the Act in mind and the nature of the disability suffered by employee. As such, I hold that the disability suffered by the petitioner has to be construed as suffered during his service only and therefore, he is entitled to the benefits of the said Act."
It is therefore not open to the APSRTC to contend that the Act of 1995 is not applicable to the case of the petitioner as his accident did not occur in connection with or out of his employment.
The sheet anchor of the APSRTC's defence against the petitioner's claim for alternate employment in terms of Section 47(1) of the Act of 1995 is his alleged voluntary exercise of option for retirement on medical grounds accepting admissible additional monetary benefits in lieu of alternate employment. Sri C.Sunil Kumar Reddy, learned standing counsel, placed reliance on the APSRTC's Circular No.PD-44/2004 dated 23.11.2004 and Circular No.PD-40/2005 dated 26.08.2005 in this regard. Copies of the said Circulars are placed before me and reflect that instructions were issued thereunder as to the procedure to be followed for retirement of employees on grounds of ill-health and inability to perform duties. Relevant to note, no mention is made in the said Circulars of the mandatory social welfare benefit posited by Section 47 of the Act of 1995. Under the Circular dated 26.08.2005, the APSRTC advised implementation of the amended regulations with regard to payment of additional monetary benefits. The Circular, to the extent relevant for the purpose of this case, is extracted: a) If a Driver is found unfit in periodical medical examination by the Medical Officer, he should not be retired on medical grounds straightaway. He shall be directed to the Superintendent & Chief Medical Officer, APSRTC Hospital, Tarnaka with MTD 430, for assessing his suitability for the post of Driver. In case, the Driver is found fit he shall be taken back on duty. If the Driver is found unfit, he shall then be retired on medical grounds, and the Addl. Monetary Benefit in lieu of employment as envisaged in Reg.6A(5)(b) of "APSRTC Employees' (Service) Regulations, 1964" that are notified through the reference 2nd cited shall be extended, if he opts for the same in the prescribed proforma (Annexure- A).
b) If the Driver willingly opts for retirement on medical grounds in the prescribed proforma (Annexure-A), in view of his health conditions, he shall be directed with MTD 430 to APSRTC Hospital, Tarnaka before the Chairman of the Chairman of the Committee constituted with the following Members, to examine his case. On the report of the above Committee, he shall be retired on medical grounds, if found unfit, and the Addl. Monetary Benefit in lieu of employment as per the amended Reg.6A(5)(b) of "APSRTC Employees' (Service) Regulations" shall be extended on medical retirement."
It is pursuant to the above Circular that the petitioner is said to have voluntarily opted for payment of monetary benefits in lieu of employment. Significantly, though the Circular itself does not speak of Section 47 of the Act of 1995, Annexure-A appended thereto states as follows: "I accept the Additional Monetary Benefit offered to me in lieu of alternative appointment under the provisions of Sec.47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 OR under any other Law/Agreement in force. On my retirement on medical grounds as stated above, I cease to be an employee of the Corporation and I have no right to claim alternative appointment under the said Act or any other Law/Agreement in force."
A copy of the duly filled in printed format contained in Annexure-A submitted by the petitioner on 13.11.2006 is also placed before me. Being a printed format, all that was required to be done was the filling in of the name and details of the petitioner and the affixation of his signature. The signatures of the witnesses along with their details are found thereunder. This document is said to embody the voluntary waiver of his statutory right by the petitioner. This practice on the part of the APSRTC, in providing a printed format to nullify the mandatory benefit conferred by a social welfare legislation, to say the very least, is not only shockingly retrogressive but is a blasphemy against the beneficial objectives underlying Section 47 of the Act of 1995. In the light of the mandatory obligation placed on the APSRTC to protect employees acquiring disability while in its service, the procedure adopted by it to do away with such employees by offering monetary benefits and printing a 'prescribed format' in this regard is nothing short of doing violence to the statutory obligatory duty cast upon it. Waiver of the right vested in an employee under Section 47 of the Act of 1995, if at all, could only be in exceptional circumstances and must necessarily be demonstrated by an informed and fully conscious expression of such waiver by the said employee. A mere printed format baldly stating to the effect that the employee was accepting monetary benefits in lieu of alternate employment under Section 47 of the Act of 1995 falls far short of the requirements to validate such waiver. The level of literacy of the employees in the APSRTC itself being open to question, mere affixation of their signatures in such printed formats would neither demonstrate nor amount to an informed decision on their part to waive their statutory right. The attitude of the APSRTC in resorting to such a practice therefore requires to be deprecated in the strongest terms.
Except for this so-called waiver of his right to alternate employment under Section 47 of the Act of 1995, it is not demonstrated on facts that the petitioner chose to settle for financial benefits in lieu of alternate employment. All through, his consistent endeavour as reflected in the many missives addressed by him to the APSRTC was to secure alternate employment. There is also no evidence on record that the petitioner ever accepted the additional monetary benefits offered to him by the APSRTC in pursuance of his so-called option. That being so, this Court is of the considered opinion that the APSRTC cannot bank upon the dubious and self-serving 'Annexure-A' option obtained by it from the petitioner to deny him the statutory benefit under Section 47 of the Act of 1995.
Reference in this regard may also be made to the Judgment of the Supreme Court in BHAGWAN DASS v. PUNJAB STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD6. That was a case where an employee, having sought retirement owing to the physical disability acquired during his service, wished to withdraw the request and opt for alternate employment in terms of Section 47 of the Act of 1995. His request was turned down. Dealing with this factual scenario, the Supreme Court observed: "17. From the materials brought before the court by none other than the respondent Board it is manifest that notwithstanding the clear and definite legislative mandate some officers of the Board took the view that it was not right to continue a blind, useless man on the Board's rolls and to pay him monthly salary in return of no service. They accordingly persuaded each other that the appellant had himself asked for retirement from service and, therefore, he was not entitled to the protection of the Act. The only material on the basis of which the officers of the Board took the stand that the appellant had himself made a request for retirement on medical grounds was his letter dated 17-7-1996. The letter was written when a charge-sheet was issued to him and in the letter he was trying to explain his absence from duty. In this letter he requested to be retired but at the same time asked that his wife should be given a suitable job in his place. In our view it is impossible to read that letter as a voluntary offer for retirement.
18. Appellant 1 was a Class IV employee, a lineman. He completely lost his vision. He was not aware of any protection that the law afforded him and apparently believed that the blindness would cause him to lose his job, the source of livelihood of his family. The enormous mental pressure under which he would have been at that time is not difficult to imagine. In those circumstances it was the duty of the superior officers to explain to him the correct legal position and to tell him about his legal rights. Instead of doing that they threw him out of service by picking up a sentence from his letter, completely out of context. The action of the officers concerned of the Board, to our mind, was deprecable."
The action of the APSRTC in the present case in seeking to rid itself of a disabled employee, the petitioner herein, being akin to that of the Board in the case before the Supreme Court, is equally deprecable and warrants condemnation. The order dated 13.11.2006 retiring the petitioner from service suffers from yet another illegality. Relevant to note, though in its counter the APSRTC stated that the petitioner had submitted his option in Annexure-A on 20.07.2006, what is placed before the Court is a duly filled in Annexure-A bearing the date 13.11.2006. There is no explanation as to what happened to the earlier option dated 20.07.2006 adverted to in the counter.
On the basis of the option said to have been submitted by the petitioner on 13.11.2006, the APSRTC retired him with retrospective effect from 27.10.2006. The order itself refers to the petitioner's application dated 13.11.2006 and no mention is made therein of any earlier option having been exercised. Reference may be made to the Judgment of the Delhi High Court in MRS.USHA KUMAR v. SUPER BAZAR CO-OPERATIVE STORE LTD.7, wherein it was held that dismissal from service could not be made effective retrospectively. Reliance was placed by the Delhi High Court on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in STATE OF PUNJAB v. AMAR SINGH HARIKA8. The Supreme Court was dealing with a dismissal order which had not been communicated for nearly two years. The Court held that upon the mere passing the order would not become effective unless it is communicated to the officer concerned. Therefore it could not take effect from the date on which it was actually passed and would come into force only on the date of its communication. The order dated 13.11.2006 retrospectively retiring the petitioner from service with effect from 27.10.2006 is therefore unsustainable in law on this count also.
The proceedings dated 13.11.2006 and the order dated 14.12.2007 are accordingly set aside. The APSRTC is directed to forthwith provide alternate employment to the petitioner in a suitable post with the same pay scale and service benefits enjoyed by him at the time of his retirement from service and if necessary, by creating a supernumerary post. It is relevant to note that under the second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 47 of the Act of 1995, the employer is obligated to create a supernumerary post to accommodate the disabled employee in the event it is not possible to adjust him against any existing post. This indicates that such an employee is not to be subjected to a break in service for want of a suitable post being immediately available. The petitioner herein would therefore be entitled to claim continuity of service for all purposes from the date of his so-called retirement from service under the proceedings dated 13.11.2006. As he was deprived of a social welfare benefit statutorily vested in him under the Act of 1995, the APSRTC has no right to deny him the financial benefits for the period that he was deliberately and willfully kept out of its service. The petitioner would therefore be entitled to full back wages from the date of his retirement from service till his reinstatement in a suitable post. The Writ Petition is accordingly allowed with costs, quantified at Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand).
In his response dated 13.01.2008, the petitioner again repeated that he was not interested in monetary benefits and was keen on being provided alternate employment. He disclaimed knowledge of the application dated 13.11.2006 said to have been submitted by him waiving his right to alternate employment in favour of additional monetary benefits. He specifically stated that the same was done keeping him in the dark and that he was never informed of the same. He again reiterated that he had no other source of income and had to provide for his family including three school going children.
Challenging the proceedings dated 13.11.2006 retiring him from service with effect from 27.10.2006 and the order dated 14.12.2007 rejecting his request for alternate employment, the petitioner filed the present case. In its counter, the APSRTC stated that the petitioner's accident did not occur during the course of his employment but thereafter, he was found unfit to continue in service as a Driver. Reference was made to the APSRTC's Circular dated 26.08.2005 whereby a Driver could opt for retirement on medical grounds in view of ill-health. The APSRTC stated that the petitioner submitted his option in Annexure-A on 20.07.2006 seeking to retire on medical grounds and accepting the offer of additional monetary benefits. It contended that as the petitioner voluntarily submitted his option for retirement on medical grounds choosing payment of admissible additional monetary benefits, he could not seek alternate employment as per Section 47 of the Act of 1995. The APSRTC therefore sought to support its order dated 14.12.2007.
In his reply, the petitioner reaffirmed that he never submitted a letter seeking voluntary retirement and that he was not explained anything while obtaining his signatures. He pointed out that he made many representations but nothing had been informed to him and that, in any event, he had not received any additional monetary benefits. He therefore assailed the action of the APSRTC in denying him alternate employment stating that the same was arbitrary and in violation of the statutory and constitutional protections afforded to him. Heard Sri V.Narsimha Goud, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri C.Sunil Kumar Reddy, learned standing counsel for the APSRTC.
The issue that falls for consideration is whether the APSRTC's action in denying alternate employment to the petitioner is valid and lawful in the light of Section 47 of the Act of 1995.
Section 47 of the Act of 1995, to the extent relevant, reads as under: "47. Non-discrimination in Government employments:- (1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service;
Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefit:
Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier."
There is no dispute that the APSRTC is covered by the Act of 1995 being an establishment as defined in Section 2(k) thereof [SYED MUSEBULLA ALI v. SECRETARY, GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS1 and MD.JANI MIYA v. APSRTC2].
The import of Section 47 of the Act of 1995 was considered by the Supreme Court in KUNAL SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA3. The observations of the Supreme Court in this regard are apposite:
"9. Chapter VI of the Act deals with employment relating to persons with disabilities, who are yet to secure employment. Section 47, which falls in Chapter VIII, deals with an employee, who is already in service and acquires a disability during his service. It must be borne in mind that Section 2 of the Act has given distinct and different definitions of "disability" and "person with disability". It is well settled that in the same enactment if two distinct definitions are given defining a word/expression, they must be understood accordingly in terms of the definition. It must be remembered that a person does not acquire or suffer disability by choice. An employee, who acquires disability during his service, is sought to be protected under Section 47 of the Act specifically. Such employee, acquiring disability, if not protected, would not only suffer himself, but possibly all those who depend on him would also suffer. The very frame and contents of Section 47 clearly indicate its mandatory nature. The very opening part of the section reads "no establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service". The section further provides that if an employee after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits; if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post he will be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. Added to this no promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability as is evident from sub-section (2) of Section 47. Section 47 contains a clear directive that the employer shall not dispense with or reduce in rank an employee who acquires a disability during the service. In construing a provision of a social beneficial enactment that too dealing with disabled persons intended to give them equal opportunities, protection of rights and full participation, the view that advances the object of the Act and serves its purpose must be preferred to the one which obstructs the object and paralyses the purpose of the Act. Language of Section 47 is plain and certain casting statutory obligation on the employer to protect an employee acquiring disability during service."
Thus, the clear language of Section 47(1) and the interpretation thereof by the Supreme Court as reflected supra leave no room for doubt that the APSRTC is under a statutory obligation not to dispense with an employee who acquires a disability during his service.
Sri C.Sunil Kumar Reddy, learned standing counsel, argued that as the accident due to which the petitioner sustained disability was not in the course of his employment, the Act of 1995 would have no application. This argument does not hold water. The perspicuous wording of Section 47 indicates that any disability acquired by an employee 'during his service' would bring him within the protective umbrella of the said provision and it is not necessary that the disability should be a direct consequence of or be connected to his employment. In any event, this issue is no longer res integra. In SK. MOULANA v. DEPOT MANAGER, APSRTC, BANSWADA DEPOT, NIZAMABAD DISTRICT4, a learned Judge of this Court while dealing with a similar contention observed:
"8. The above provision of law is an enabling provision to provide alternate employment in the event of an employee acquiring some disability during the course of service. The words "during his service" in my considered view shall not be interpreted in a narrow compass that at the relevant point of time the employee shall be in actual service. It is sufficient if the employee is on the rolls of the organization when he met with an accident at the relevant point of time. The organization has a duty to create alternate employment as per Section 47 of the Act. In fact, Section 47 of the Act makes it clear that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier."
Again in M.V.RAMANA RAO v. APSRTC5, a learned Judge of this Court dealing with a similar contention observed:
"......... the words 'disability during the course of service' as mentioned in Section 47 of the said Act has to be construed meaningfully keeping the objectives of the Act in mind and the nature of the disability suffered by employee. As such, I hold that the disability suffered by the petitioner has to be construed as suffered during his service only and therefore, he is entitled to the benefits of the said Act."
It is therefore not open to the APSRTC to contend that the Act of 1995 is not applicable to the case of the petitioner as his accident did not occur in connection with or out of his employment.
The sheet anchor of the APSRTC's defence against the petitioner's claim for alternate employment in terms of Section 47(1) of the Act of 1995 is his alleged voluntary exercise of option for retirement on medical grounds accepting admissible additional monetary benefits in lieu of alternate employment. Sri C.Sunil Kumar Reddy, learned standing counsel, placed reliance on the APSRTC's Circular No.PD-44/2004 dated 23.11.2004 and Circular No.PD-40/2005 dated 26.08.2005 in this regard. Copies of the said Circulars are placed before me and reflect that instructions were issued thereunder as to the procedure to be followed for retirement of employees on grounds of ill-health and inability to perform duties. Relevant to note, no mention is made in the said Circulars of the mandatory social welfare benefit posited by Section 47 of the Act of 1995. Under the Circular dated 26.08.2005, the APSRTC advised implementation of the amended regulations with regard to payment of additional monetary benefits. The Circular, to the extent relevant for the purpose of this case, is extracted: a) If a Driver is found unfit in periodical medical examination by the Medical Officer, he should not be retired on medical grounds straightaway. He shall be directed to the Superintendent & Chief Medical Officer, APSRTC Hospital, Tarnaka with MTD 430, for assessing his suitability for the post of Driver. In case, the Driver is found fit he shall be taken back on duty. If the Driver is found unfit, he shall then be retired on medical grounds, and the Addl. Monetary Benefit in lieu of employment as envisaged in Reg.6A(5)(b) of "APSRTC Employees' (Service) Regulations, 1964" that are notified through the reference 2nd cited shall be extended, if he opts for the same in the prescribed proforma (Annexure- A).
b) If the Driver willingly opts for retirement on medical grounds in the prescribed proforma (Annexure-A), in view of his health conditions, he shall be directed with MTD 430 to APSRTC Hospital, Tarnaka before the Chairman of the Chairman of the Committee constituted with the following Members, to examine his case. On the report of the above Committee, he shall be retired on medical grounds, if found unfit, and the Addl. Monetary Benefit in lieu of employment as per the amended Reg.6A(5)(b) of "APSRTC Employees' (Service) Regulations" shall be extended on medical retirement."
It is pursuant to the above Circular that the petitioner is said to have voluntarily opted for payment of monetary benefits in lieu of employment. Significantly, though the Circular itself does not speak of Section 47 of the Act of 1995, Annexure-A appended thereto states as follows: "I accept the Additional Monetary Benefit offered to me in lieu of alternative appointment under the provisions of Sec.47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 OR under any other Law/Agreement in force. On my retirement on medical grounds as stated above, I cease to be an employee of the Corporation and I have no right to claim alternative appointment under the said Act or any other Law/Agreement in force."
A copy of the duly filled in printed format contained in Annexure-A submitted by the petitioner on 13.11.2006 is also placed before me. Being a printed format, all that was required to be done was the filling in of the name and details of the petitioner and the affixation of his signature. The signatures of the witnesses along with their details are found thereunder. This document is said to embody the voluntary waiver of his statutory right by the petitioner. This practice on the part of the APSRTC, in providing a printed format to nullify the mandatory benefit conferred by a social welfare legislation, to say the very least, is not only shockingly retrogressive but is a blasphemy against the beneficial objectives underlying Section 47 of the Act of 1995. In the light of the mandatory obligation placed on the APSRTC to protect employees acquiring disability while in its service, the procedure adopted by it to do away with such employees by offering monetary benefits and printing a 'prescribed format' in this regard is nothing short of doing violence to the statutory obligatory duty cast upon it. Waiver of the right vested in an employee under Section 47 of the Act of 1995, if at all, could only be in exceptional circumstances and must necessarily be demonstrated by an informed and fully conscious expression of such waiver by the said employee. A mere printed format baldly stating to the effect that the employee was accepting monetary benefits in lieu of alternate employment under Section 47 of the Act of 1995 falls far short of the requirements to validate such waiver. The level of literacy of the employees in the APSRTC itself being open to question, mere affixation of their signatures in such printed formats would neither demonstrate nor amount to an informed decision on their part to waive their statutory right. The attitude of the APSRTC in resorting to such a practice therefore requires to be deprecated in the strongest terms.
Except for this so-called waiver of his right to alternate employment under Section 47 of the Act of 1995, it is not demonstrated on facts that the petitioner chose to settle for financial benefits in lieu of alternate employment. All through, his consistent endeavour as reflected in the many missives addressed by him to the APSRTC was to secure alternate employment. There is also no evidence on record that the petitioner ever accepted the additional monetary benefits offered to him by the APSRTC in pursuance of his so-called option. That being so, this Court is of the considered opinion that the APSRTC cannot bank upon the dubious and self-serving 'Annexure-A' option obtained by it from the petitioner to deny him the statutory benefit under Section 47 of the Act of 1995.
Reference in this regard may also be made to the Judgment of the Supreme Court in BHAGWAN DASS v. PUNJAB STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD6. That was a case where an employee, having sought retirement owing to the physical disability acquired during his service, wished to withdraw the request and opt for alternate employment in terms of Section 47 of the Act of 1995. His request was turned down. Dealing with this factual scenario, the Supreme Court observed: "17. From the materials brought before the court by none other than the respondent Board it is manifest that notwithstanding the clear and definite legislative mandate some officers of the Board took the view that it was not right to continue a blind, useless man on the Board's rolls and to pay him monthly salary in return of no service. They accordingly persuaded each other that the appellant had himself asked for retirement from service and, therefore, he was not entitled to the protection of the Act. The only material on the basis of which the officers of the Board took the stand that the appellant had himself made a request for retirement on medical grounds was his letter dated 17-7-1996. The letter was written when a charge-sheet was issued to him and in the letter he was trying to explain his absence from duty. In this letter he requested to be retired but at the same time asked that his wife should be given a suitable job in his place. In our view it is impossible to read that letter as a voluntary offer for retirement.
18. Appellant 1 was a Class IV employee, a lineman. He completely lost his vision. He was not aware of any protection that the law afforded him and apparently believed that the blindness would cause him to lose his job, the source of livelihood of his family. The enormous mental pressure under which he would have been at that time is not difficult to imagine. In those circumstances it was the duty of the superior officers to explain to him the correct legal position and to tell him about his legal rights. Instead of doing that they threw him out of service by picking up a sentence from his letter, completely out of context. The action of the officers concerned of the Board, to our mind, was deprecable."
The action of the APSRTC in the present case in seeking to rid itself of a disabled employee, the petitioner herein, being akin to that of the Board in the case before the Supreme Court, is equally deprecable and warrants condemnation. The order dated 13.11.2006 retiring the petitioner from service suffers from yet another illegality. Relevant to note, though in its counter the APSRTC stated that the petitioner had submitted his option in Annexure-A on 20.07.2006, what is placed before the Court is a duly filled in Annexure-A bearing the date 13.11.2006. There is no explanation as to what happened to the earlier option dated 20.07.2006 adverted to in the counter.
On the basis of the option said to have been submitted by the petitioner on 13.11.2006, the APSRTC retired him with retrospective effect from 27.10.2006. The order itself refers to the petitioner's application dated 13.11.2006 and no mention is made therein of any earlier option having been exercised. Reference may be made to the Judgment of the Delhi High Court in MRS.USHA KUMAR v. SUPER BAZAR CO-OPERATIVE STORE LTD.7, wherein it was held that dismissal from service could not be made effective retrospectively. Reliance was placed by the Delhi High Court on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in STATE OF PUNJAB v. AMAR SINGH HARIKA8. The Supreme Court was dealing with a dismissal order which had not been communicated for nearly two years. The Court held that upon the mere passing the order would not become effective unless it is communicated to the officer concerned. Therefore it could not take effect from the date on which it was actually passed and would come into force only on the date of its communication. The order dated 13.11.2006 retrospectively retiring the petitioner from service with effect from 27.10.2006 is therefore unsustainable in law on this count also.
The proceedings dated 13.11.2006 and the order dated 14.12.2007 are accordingly set aside. The APSRTC is directed to forthwith provide alternate employment to the petitioner in a suitable post with the same pay scale and service benefits enjoyed by him at the time of his retirement from service and if necessary, by creating a supernumerary post. It is relevant to note that under the second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 47 of the Act of 1995, the employer is obligated to create a supernumerary post to accommodate the disabled employee in the event it is not possible to adjust him against any existing post. This indicates that such an employee is not to be subjected to a break in service for want of a suitable post being immediately available. The petitioner herein would therefore be entitled to claim continuity of service for all purposes from the date of his so-called retirement from service under the proceedings dated 13.11.2006. As he was deprived of a social welfare benefit statutorily vested in him under the Act of 1995, the APSRTC has no right to deny him the financial benefits for the period that he was deliberately and willfully kept out of its service. The petitioner would therefore be entitled to full back wages from the date of his retirement from service till his reinstatement in a suitable post. The Writ Petition is accordingly allowed with costs, quantified at Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand).
APSRTC, TO FIX THE PAY OF THE PETITIONERS IN THE TIME SCALE ATTACHED TO THE POST OF JUNIOR ASSISTANT
The petitioners 1 to 6 joined the services of the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (for short "the A.P.S.R.T.C.") as Conductors with effect from 1-8-1986, 1-8-1985, 1-8-1987, 28-11-1984, 1-8-1987 and 15-6-1984 respectively. The petitioners, while working as Conductors, applied for the post of Junior Assistant by way of direct recruitment. After going through the selection procedure, the petitioners 1 to 6 were appointed to the post of Junior Assistant with effect from 22-7-1987,29-8-1988,15-12-1988,18-10-1987, 14-4-1988 and 16-2-1987 respectively. The petitioners while working as Conductors had acquired the Graduation qualification, and under the relevant Circulars issued by the Management of the A.P.S.R.T.C., they were granted three additional increments at the rate of Rs.15/-. After their appointment to the post of Junior Assistant, the respondent-Management while fixing their pay in the time scale attached to the post of Junior Assistant did not take into account the three additional increments granted to the petitioners when they worked as Conductors. In this writ petition, the petitioners have complained that the respondent-Management ought to have taken into account the three additional increments granted to them for having acquired graduate qualification when they were serving as Conductors while fixing their pay in the time scale attached to the post of Junior Assistant.
2. In response of rule nisi, the respondents have filed their counter-affidavit. In the counter-affidavit, it is contended that having regard to the provisions of Regulation 7-A of the A.P.S.R.T.C. Employees Service Regulations, 1964 (for short "Service Regulations"), the personal pay of Rs.45/- granted to the petitioners when they worked as conductors having acquired graduate qualification need not be taken into account while fixing their pay in the time scale attached to the post of Junior Assistant. It is also contended that the Chief Personnel Manager in his letter dated 30-11-1989 has clarified that personal pay need not be taken into account for fixation of pay in the time scale under Regulation 7A(e) of the Service Regulations. Further, it is contended that in the Minutes of the Joint Meetings of the Executive Director/Heads of Departments with APSRTC National Mazdoor Union held on 14-9-1992 and 15-9-1992 communicated through letter No.lR.11/264(9)/92-SM(IR), dated 14-10-1992, it was agreed that the graduate conductors once appointed to the post of Junior Assistant against the direct recruitment quota are not entitled for the graduate increments.
3. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that having due regard to the definition of the term 'pay' as defined under Clause (x) of Regulation 2 of the A.P.S.R.T.C. (Pay and Allowance) Regulation, 1964 (for short "Pay and Allowance Regulations") and the unambiguous language employed in Clause (e) of Regulation 7A of the Service Regulations, the respondents are bound to take into account the personal pay of Rs.45/- granted to the petitioners when they worked as conductors while fixing the pay of the petitioners in the time scale attached to the post of Junior Assistant.
4. On the other hand, Sri C, V. Kamulu, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the A.P.S.R.T.C. contended that Rule 7A(e) of the Service Regulations deals with the protection of pay in the time scale and not the protection of personal pay or any other incentives granted to the conductors. The learned Standing Counsel would also meekly contend that in view of the agreement entered into between the Management and the A.P.S.R.T.C. National Mazdoor Union, the petitioners are not entitled to claim that the personal pay of Rs.45/- should have been taken into account while fixing their pay in the time scale attached to the post of Junior Assistant.
5. Let me at the threshold state that there is no controversy and there cannot be any controversy that the three increments totally amounting to Rs,45/-, granted to the petitioners when they worked as conductors is "personal pay" within the meaning of that term as defined under Regulation 2(xi) of the Pay and Allowance Regulations. According to this Clause, "personal pay" means among other things, an additional pay granted to an employee on other personal considerations. Three increments were granted to the petitioners-conductors on the consideration that they acquired graduate qualification and on such acquisition, they were entitled to the personal pay as per the then relevant circulars issued by the Management of the Corporation from time to time. Even according to the learned Standing Counsel, three increments were granted to the petitioners as "personal pay". In that view of the matter, I need not dilate on the concept/meaning of "personal pay" as defined under Clause (xi). Clause (x) of Regulation 2 of Pay and Allowance Regulations defines the term "pay". The definition includes "personal pay" also. In the backdrop of the position reflected in the statutory definition, the thing to be seen is whether when the Management proceed to fix the pay of the petitioners in the time scale of the new post, should or should not it take into account the personal pay granted to the petitioners when they worked as conductors ?
6. Regulation 7A of the Service Regulations reads as under :
"7A. Benefit of past service to employees in the Service of the Corporation selected by direct recruitment to another post:
Notwithstanding anything contrary in these or any other regulations for the time being in force, an employee in the service of the Corporation who is selected for appointment by direct recruitment in another post in the service of the Corporation, whether in the same or any other class or category, subject to the other provisions of these or the other regulations as the case may be shall be eligible;
(a) to carry forward the leave at his credit on the date of such appointment;
(b) to reckon his service in the new post as a continuation of his service in the former post for the purpose of calculating the gratuity due to him on his retirement from the service of the Corporation due to superannuation;
(c) to continue as a member of the Provident Fund established by the Corporation without being required to put in a fresh terms of qualifying service or if he not already such a member, to count his service in the former post to qualify himself for becoming a member of the Provident Fund in the next post;
(d) to joining time and transfer travelling allowance to join his new post; and
(e) for Fixation of pay in the time scale of the new post at the stage equal to the pay in the former post and if there is no such stage, at the next higher stage of pay in the new post."
The Court is not called upon to interpret the provisions contained in Clauses (a) to (d) of Regulation 7-A. The relevant clause to be considered and interpreted is Clause (e). Regulation 7-A(e) provides that notwithstanding anything contrary in the Service Regulations or any other Regulations for the time being in force, an employee in the service of the Corporation who is selected for appointment by direct recruitment in another post in the service ofthe Corporation, whether in the same or any other class or category, subject to the other provisions of the Service Regulations or the other regulations as the case may be, shall be eligible for fixation of pay in the time scale of the new post at the stage equal to the pay in the former post (emphasis is supplied by the Court) and if there is no such stage, at the next higher stage of pay in the new post. The language employed in Clause (e), in my considered opinion is clear, precise, unambiguous and it does not admit more than one meaning. However, Sri C. V. Ramulti, learned Standing Counsel, quite strenuously contended that in interpreting the term "pay" occurring in Clause (e) of Regulation 7-A of the Service Regulations, the Court should interpret that term in such a way as to mean "pay in the time scale" as defined in Clause (xvii) of Regulation 2 of the Pay and Allowance Regulations. In my considered opinion, this contention of the learned Counsel is unsound and not at all acceptable. Clause (xvii) of Regulation 2 of Pay and Allowance Regulations defines the term "Time scale of Pay" to mean the pay to which an employee rises consequent on periodical increments from a minimum to a maximum at the prescribed rates within the grade in which lie has been placed. There is absolutely no reference in the definition of the term, "Pay in the Time Scale" to any personal pay, substantive pay, officiating pay, special pay. Be that as it may, the rule making authority having defined the terms "pay", "personal pay", "presumptive pay", "special pay", "substantive pay", "time scale of pay" has deliberately chosen the term "pay" in Clause (e) of Regulation 7-A ofthe Service Regulations. If the intention of the rule making authority is that while fixing pay of an employee in the time scale attached to the new post, only the pay in the time scale of the former post or substantive pay should be taken into account, there was absolutely no difficulty for the rule making authority to employ those terms in Clause (e) in its wisdom. It is well settled principle of interpretation that when the Legislature or rule making authority has employed a particular term defined by it, in the Statute, the provisions of the Statute should be interpreted and understood giving due regard to the definition. Definition is a key word to understand the Statute. Definition of a term in the Statute, it is said, is a dictionary to understand the provisions of the Statute and the definition should be adhered to unless the Court finds that the adherence to the statutory definition leads to absurdity. If the term "pay" as defined under the Pay and Allowance Regulation is employed, I do not think that the result would lead to any absurdity and the learned Standing Counsel was not in a position to demonstrate such absurdity.
7. If the term "pay" includes "personal pay" (as pointed out supra), it goes without saying that the Management is bound to take into account the "personal pay" i.e., Rs.45/- granted to the petitioners as additional increments when they worked as conductors when it proceeds to fix the pay of the petitioners in the time scale of the Junior Assistants. To avoid any confusion, it is necessary for me at this stage itself to point out that Service Regulations do not define the term "pay". Only Pay and Allowance Regulations as pointed out supra define the term "pay". But, Clause (xiv) of Regulation 2 of the Service Regulations provides that words and expressions used in the Service Regulations, but defined in other regulations made by the Corporation under Section 45 of the Road Transport Act, 1950, shall have respectively the meaning assigned to them in those regulations. Service Regulations as well as Pay and Allowance Regulations are framed by the rule making authority by virtue of the power granted to it under Section 45 of the R.T.C. Act, 1950. Therefore, the definition of the term "pay" as defined in Clause (x) of Regulation 2 of Pay and Allowances Regulations should be borne in mind while interpreting the term, "pay" occurring under Regulation 7-A(e) of the Service Regulations.
8. The contentions based on the letter of the Chief Personal Manager and the so called agreement entered into between the A.P.S.R.T.C. National Mazdoor Union and the Management of the A.P.S.R.T.C. are requiring to be noticed only to be rejected. All the petitioners were appointed to the post of Junior Assistant by way of direct recruitment during the years 1987 and 1988 whereas both these documents came into existence subsequent to those years. It is trite to state that the subjective opinion of the Chief Personnel Manager contained in his letter dated 30-11-1989 is totally irrelevant for the Court to interpret the statutory regulations and form opinion. Adverting to the agreement between the Trade Union and the Management, suffice it to state that this document was not produced before the Court. However, Sri C. V. Ramulu, learned Standing Counsel, submitted that the agreement seems to be one entered into between the parties under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is well settled that any agreement entered into between the parties under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act binds only those workmen who are parties to the agreement, and not other workers. In the first place, in the counter it is not claimed that the petitioners were members of the Trade Unions which were parties to the agreement. In the absence of such plea and proof, the Court cannot hold that the petitioners are bound by the agreement.
9. In the result, and for the foregoing reasons, I allow the writ petition. A direction shall issue to the respondents to fix the pay of the petitioners in the time scale attached to the post of Junior Assistant taking into account the Personal pay of Rs. 45/- granted to them for having acquired the graduate qualification when they worked as conductors and pay the arrears to the petitioners. No costs.
2. In response of rule nisi, the respondents have filed their counter-affidavit. In the counter-affidavit, it is contended that having regard to the provisions of Regulation 7-A of the A.P.S.R.T.C. Employees Service Regulations, 1964 (for short "Service Regulations"), the personal pay of Rs.45/- granted to the petitioners when they worked as conductors having acquired graduate qualification need not be taken into account while fixing their pay in the time scale attached to the post of Junior Assistant. It is also contended that the Chief Personnel Manager in his letter dated 30-11-1989 has clarified that personal pay need not be taken into account for fixation of pay in the time scale under Regulation 7A(e) of the Service Regulations. Further, it is contended that in the Minutes of the Joint Meetings of the Executive Director/Heads of Departments with APSRTC National Mazdoor Union held on 14-9-1992 and 15-9-1992 communicated through letter No.lR.11/264(9)/92-SM(IR), dated 14-10-1992, it was agreed that the graduate conductors once appointed to the post of Junior Assistant against the direct recruitment quota are not entitled for the graduate increments.
3. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that having due regard to the definition of the term 'pay' as defined under Clause (x) of Regulation 2 of the A.P.S.R.T.C. (Pay and Allowance) Regulation, 1964 (for short "Pay and Allowance Regulations") and the unambiguous language employed in Clause (e) of Regulation 7A of the Service Regulations, the respondents are bound to take into account the personal pay of Rs.45/- granted to the petitioners when they worked as conductors while fixing the pay of the petitioners in the time scale attached to the post of Junior Assistant.
4. On the other hand, Sri C, V. Kamulu, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the A.P.S.R.T.C. contended that Rule 7A(e) of the Service Regulations deals with the protection of pay in the time scale and not the protection of personal pay or any other incentives granted to the conductors. The learned Standing Counsel would also meekly contend that in view of the agreement entered into between the Management and the A.P.S.R.T.C. National Mazdoor Union, the petitioners are not entitled to claim that the personal pay of Rs.45/- should have been taken into account while fixing their pay in the time scale attached to the post of Junior Assistant.
5. Let me at the threshold state that there is no controversy and there cannot be any controversy that the three increments totally amounting to Rs,45/-, granted to the petitioners when they worked as conductors is "personal pay" within the meaning of that term as defined under Regulation 2(xi) of the Pay and Allowance Regulations. According to this Clause, "personal pay" means among other things, an additional pay granted to an employee on other personal considerations. Three increments were granted to the petitioners-conductors on the consideration that they acquired graduate qualification and on such acquisition, they were entitled to the personal pay as per the then relevant circulars issued by the Management of the Corporation from time to time. Even according to the learned Standing Counsel, three increments were granted to the petitioners as "personal pay". In that view of the matter, I need not dilate on the concept/meaning of "personal pay" as defined under Clause (xi). Clause (x) of Regulation 2 of Pay and Allowance Regulations defines the term "pay". The definition includes "personal pay" also. In the backdrop of the position reflected in the statutory definition, the thing to be seen is whether when the Management proceed to fix the pay of the petitioners in the time scale of the new post, should or should not it take into account the personal pay granted to the petitioners when they worked as conductors ?
6. Regulation 7A of the Service Regulations reads as under :
"7A. Benefit of past service to employees in the Service of the Corporation selected by direct recruitment to another post:
Notwithstanding anything contrary in these or any other regulations for the time being in force, an employee in the service of the Corporation who is selected for appointment by direct recruitment in another post in the service of the Corporation, whether in the same or any other class or category, subject to the other provisions of these or the other regulations as the case may be shall be eligible;
(a) to carry forward the leave at his credit on the date of such appointment;
(b) to reckon his service in the new post as a continuation of his service in the former post for the purpose of calculating the gratuity due to him on his retirement from the service of the Corporation due to superannuation;
(c) to continue as a member of the Provident Fund established by the Corporation without being required to put in a fresh terms of qualifying service or if he not already such a member, to count his service in the former post to qualify himself for becoming a member of the Provident Fund in the next post;
(d) to joining time and transfer travelling allowance to join his new post; and
(e) for Fixation of pay in the time scale of the new post at the stage equal to the pay in the former post and if there is no such stage, at the next higher stage of pay in the new post."
The Court is not called upon to interpret the provisions contained in Clauses (a) to (d) of Regulation 7-A. The relevant clause to be considered and interpreted is Clause (e). Regulation 7-A(e) provides that notwithstanding anything contrary in the Service Regulations or any other Regulations for the time being in force, an employee in the service of the Corporation who is selected for appointment by direct recruitment in another post in the service ofthe Corporation, whether in the same or any other class or category, subject to the other provisions of the Service Regulations or the other regulations as the case may be, shall be eligible for fixation of pay in the time scale of the new post at the stage equal to the pay in the former post (emphasis is supplied by the Court) and if there is no such stage, at the next higher stage of pay in the new post. The language employed in Clause (e), in my considered opinion is clear, precise, unambiguous and it does not admit more than one meaning. However, Sri C. V. Ramulti, learned Standing Counsel, quite strenuously contended that in interpreting the term "pay" occurring in Clause (e) of Regulation 7-A of the Service Regulations, the Court should interpret that term in such a way as to mean "pay in the time scale" as defined in Clause (xvii) of Regulation 2 of the Pay and Allowance Regulations. In my considered opinion, this contention of the learned Counsel is unsound and not at all acceptable. Clause (xvii) of Regulation 2 of Pay and Allowance Regulations defines the term "Time scale of Pay" to mean the pay to which an employee rises consequent on periodical increments from a minimum to a maximum at the prescribed rates within the grade in which lie has been placed. There is absolutely no reference in the definition of the term, "Pay in the Time Scale" to any personal pay, substantive pay, officiating pay, special pay. Be that as it may, the rule making authority having defined the terms "pay", "personal pay", "presumptive pay", "special pay", "substantive pay", "time scale of pay" has deliberately chosen the term "pay" in Clause (e) of Regulation 7-A ofthe Service Regulations. If the intention of the rule making authority is that while fixing pay of an employee in the time scale attached to the new post, only the pay in the time scale of the former post or substantive pay should be taken into account, there was absolutely no difficulty for the rule making authority to employ those terms in Clause (e) in its wisdom. It is well settled principle of interpretation that when the Legislature or rule making authority has employed a particular term defined by it, in the Statute, the provisions of the Statute should be interpreted and understood giving due regard to the definition. Definition is a key word to understand the Statute. Definition of a term in the Statute, it is said, is a dictionary to understand the provisions of the Statute and the definition should be adhered to unless the Court finds that the adherence to the statutory definition leads to absurdity. If the term "pay" as defined under the Pay and Allowance Regulation is employed, I do not think that the result would lead to any absurdity and the learned Standing Counsel was not in a position to demonstrate such absurdity.
7. If the term "pay" includes "personal pay" (as pointed out supra), it goes without saying that the Management is bound to take into account the "personal pay" i.e., Rs.45/- granted to the petitioners as additional increments when they worked as conductors when it proceeds to fix the pay of the petitioners in the time scale of the Junior Assistants. To avoid any confusion, it is necessary for me at this stage itself to point out that Service Regulations do not define the term "pay". Only Pay and Allowance Regulations as pointed out supra define the term "pay". But, Clause (xiv) of Regulation 2 of the Service Regulations provides that words and expressions used in the Service Regulations, but defined in other regulations made by the Corporation under Section 45 of the Road Transport Act, 1950, shall have respectively the meaning assigned to them in those regulations. Service Regulations as well as Pay and Allowance Regulations are framed by the rule making authority by virtue of the power granted to it under Section 45 of the R.T.C. Act, 1950. Therefore, the definition of the term "pay" as defined in Clause (x) of Regulation 2 of Pay and Allowances Regulations should be borne in mind while interpreting the term, "pay" occurring under Regulation 7-A(e) of the Service Regulations.
8. The contentions based on the letter of the Chief Personal Manager and the so called agreement entered into between the A.P.S.R.T.C. National Mazdoor Union and the Management of the A.P.S.R.T.C. are requiring to be noticed only to be rejected. All the petitioners were appointed to the post of Junior Assistant by way of direct recruitment during the years 1987 and 1988 whereas both these documents came into existence subsequent to those years. It is trite to state that the subjective opinion of the Chief Personnel Manager contained in his letter dated 30-11-1989 is totally irrelevant for the Court to interpret the statutory regulations and form opinion. Adverting to the agreement between the Trade Union and the Management, suffice it to state that this document was not produced before the Court. However, Sri C. V. Ramulu, learned Standing Counsel, submitted that the agreement seems to be one entered into between the parties under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is well settled that any agreement entered into between the parties under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act binds only those workmen who are parties to the agreement, and not other workers. In the first place, in the counter it is not claimed that the petitioners were members of the Trade Unions which were parties to the agreement. In the absence of such plea and proof, the Court cannot hold that the petitioners are bound by the agreement.
9. In the result, and for the foregoing reasons, I allow the writ petition. A direction shall issue to the respondents to fix the pay of the petitioners in the time scale attached to the post of Junior Assistant taking into account the Personal pay of Rs. 45/- granted to them for having acquired the graduate qualification when they worked as conductors and pay the arrears to the petitioners. No costs.
REGULARISE SERVICES OF PETITIONERS FROM DATE WHEN THEY COMPLETED 10 YEARS
The petitioner were appointed as Cleaners/Sweepers in the respondent-APSRTC Corporation and were initially attached to Gannavaram depot in May 1989 and worked upto 30-6-1992, However, with effect from 1-7-1992 their services were terminated. Aggrieved by the same they have filed I.DU/s.2 –A (2) of I.D.Act seeking direction to the corporation to reinstate them into service with continuity of service back wages and attendant benefits. After conducting a detailed enquiry the Labour Court directed the respondent Management to reinstate the petitioners into service with continuity of service and all attendant benefits. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent Management filed W.P. and dismissed the W.P. by learned single judge. Against that, the Management has filed W.A. The Division Bench of High Court also dismissed the W.A. while upholding the order of the learned single Judge. Thus the order made in ID has attained finality. However, when the petitioner were not instated into service, they had filed E.P.s before Labour court and ultimately they were reinstated into service in November 2004 and working as such since then. The petitioner can not be blamed for not being in service between 1992 to 2004 and, therefore, their service to treated as continuous and without break. The petitioners thus having completed 21 years of service with respondent-Corporation and held entitled for regularization of their service. Moreso, when service of such similarly placed persons who approached High Court were regularized and between 2004 and 2010, at least on tow occasions , Government accorded sanction for regularization of about 4000 employees. Engaging the petitioners for such a long time as casuals is nothing but unfair labour practice with in meaning of Se.2 (ra) of ID Act S-25 –T of the said Act prohibits such unfair labour practice. By continuation of petitioners in Corporation for last more than 21 years itself, it can be construed that there are vacant posts available. Petitioners, held entitled for regularization of their service and to be put on regular timescale. WP Allowed. The respondent Corporation directed to regularize service of petitioner s from date when they completed 10 years of service and put them on timescale on 1-9-2010 with notional increments from date of regularization. However, the petitioners not entitled for any arrears of increments and revised pay scales etc.
Sunday, July 3, 2011
Form No. 61 of Income tax Rules, 1962
Form of Declaration to be filed by a person who has agricultural income and is not in receipt of any other income chargeable to income tax in respect of transactions pecified in clauses (a) to (h) of rule 114B
1. Full name and address of the declarant: ………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………….….
2. Particulars of transaction:
3. Details of the document being produced in support of address in Column(1)……………………………………………………………………………………
I hereby declare that my source of income is from agriculture and I am not required to pay income tax on any other income if any
Date: …………….
Place: ……………. ………………………
Signature of the declarant
Verification
I, ……………………………….. do hereby declare that what is stated above is true to the best of my knowledge and belief .
Verified today, the ………………. day of ……………..20…..
Date: …………….
Place: ……………. ………………………
Signature of the declarant
Instructions: Documents which can be produced in support of the address are:-
(a) Ration Card
(b) Passport
(c) Driving license
(d) Identity Card issued by any institution
(e) Copy of the electricity bill or telephone bill showing residential address
(f) Any document or communication issued by any authority or Central
Government , State Government or local bodies showing residential address
(g) Any other documentary evidence in support of his address given on the
declaration.
1. Full name and address of the declarant: ………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………….….
2. Particulars of transaction:
3. Details of the document being produced in support of address in Column(1)……………………………………………………………………………………
I hereby declare that my source of income is from agriculture and I am not required to pay income tax on any other income if any
Date: …………….
Place: ……………. ………………………
Signature of the declarant
Verification
I, ……………………………….. do hereby declare that what is stated above is true to the best of my knowledge and belief .
Verified today, the ………………. day of ……………..20…..
Date: …………….
Place: ……………. ………………………
Signature of the declarant
Instructions: Documents which can be produced in support of the address are:-
(a) Ration Card
(b) Passport
(c) Driving license
(d) Identity Card issued by any institution
(e) Copy of the electricity bill or telephone bill showing residential address
(f) Any document or communication issued by any authority or Central
Government , State Government or local bodies showing residential address
(g) Any other documentary evidence in support of his address given on the
declaration.
Form No. 60 of Income tax Rules, 1962
Form of Declaration to be filed by a person who does not have either a Permanent Account Number or General Index Register Number and who makes payment in cash in respect of transactions specified in clauses (a) to (h) of rule 114B
1. Full name and address of the declarant: ………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………….….
2. Particulars of transaction:
3. Amount of the transaction:
4. Are you assessed to tax ? Yes/No
5. If yes,
(i) Details of Ward/Circle/Range where the last return of Income was filed?
(ii) Reasons for not having Permanent Account Number/ General Index Register Number
6. Details of the document being produced in support of address in Column(1)
……………………………………………………………………………………
Verification
I, ……………………………….. do hereby declare that what is stated above is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Verified today, the ………………. day of ……………..20…..
Date: …………….
Place: ……………. ………………………
Signature of the declarant
Instructions: Documents which can be produced in support of the address are:-
(a) Ration Card
(b) Passport
(c) Driving license
(d) Identity Card issued by any institution
(e) Copy of the electricity bill or telephone bill showing residential address
(f) Any document or communication issued by any authority or Central
Government , State Government or local bodies showing residential address
(g) Any other documentary evidence in support of his address given on the
declaration.
1. Full name and address of the declarant: ………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………..
……………………………………………………………………………….….
2. Particulars of transaction:
3. Amount of the transaction:
4. Are you assessed to tax ? Yes/No
5. If yes,
(i) Details of Ward/Circle/Range where the last return of Income was filed?
(ii) Reasons for not having Permanent Account Number/ General Index Register Number
6. Details of the document being produced in support of address in Column(1)
……………………………………………………………………………………
Verification
I, ……………………………….. do hereby declare that what is stated above is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Verified today, the ………………. day of ……………..20…..
Date: …………….
Place: ……………. ………………………
Signature of the declarant
Instructions: Documents which can be produced in support of the address are:-
(a) Ration Card
(b) Passport
(c) Driving license
(d) Identity Card issued by any institution
(e) Copy of the electricity bill or telephone bill showing residential address
(f) Any document or communication issued by any authority or Central
Government , State Government or local bodies showing residential address
(g) Any other documentary evidence in support of his address given on the
declaration.
FORM OF GENERAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
Know all men by these Presents that I,…………………………………………. Son of………………………………..aged …………………….years ………………….at Present……………………………………. residing at…………………………………….. do hereby appoint and Constitute …………………………………. Son ………………………of ……………………………. as my lawful attorney in my name and on my behalf to door execute all or any of the acts, deeds or things hereinafter mentioned.
Whereas I own Properties at …………………………… and ………………………. whereas I am shortly leaving for united States of America and whereas it is not Possible for ………………. the properties personally. I do hereby execute the ……………………. of attorney authoring the said …………………… the said …………… to act behalf.
To effectively manage all my Properties situate in ……………………….
To appear and act in all Courts Civil, Criminal, Original, Revisional or appellate in the Union of Indian.
To appear in any registration office and in any other office or Court and to sign, Verify and file plaints. Written statements and petitions and also to present appeals in any Court arising out of any matter relating to my Property or Properties.
To appoint and Constitute on my behalf pleaders, Vakils, advocates or other attorneys whereas and whenever my attorney shall think proper to do so.
To Compromise, Compound or withdraw Cases or refer them to arbitration.
To sign, verify and file applications for execution of decrees of any Court and to Purchase Properties at Court auction sales in execution of decrees upto the amount of decrees.
To negotiate and to arrange for the sale of my Properties to individuals or bodies on the terms and conditions agreeable to the said attorney.
To receive from the Purchasers, the sale amounts and to grant proper receipts.
To execute a proper deeds of Conveyance of the property to the purchasers.
To present Conveyance deeds executed by the said attorney before registering officers for registration to admit execution and receipt of Consideration to have the deeds registered and to do all acts and things necessary and incidental to the execution and Completion of registration and Conveying the Properties to the Purchasers as fully and effectively by in all respects as I could do the same my self.
To lease or mortgage the Properties and to execute any deed or deeds for the said purposes.
To register any such deeds before the registering officer having jurisdiction.
To Collect rents out of the properties to initiate legal Proceedings against defaulting tenants and to recover the rents in accordance with the law in force.
To take legal action against the tenants for beach or default of any of the Convenants of the lease or any understanding or to initiate proceedings in a Competant Court and if necessary in appellate or revisional Courts to which them and in Case of Proceedings filed against me by any body, to defend me in such Cases.
To open bank accounts in any Bank and to operate the funds.
To present documents executed by me before any registration of the said deeds.
To draw, accept, endorce, give, make or negotiate any Cheque, Bill, Hundi, Note grantee or other accurity whether of the State of Central Government or otherwise for any purpose.
To substitute and appoint any person or persons to act under or in place of the said attorney or attorneys in all the matters aforesaid and from time to time every such substitution and appointment at pleasure revoke.
I hereby agree to ratify and confirm all and whatsoever my said attorney shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue of these presents
I witness where of I, the said …………………………. have here to put my signature of ……………………………this ……………………… day of ……….2000.
Sd/-
Witnesses
Prepared & Writeen by :-
Note:- Stamp duty 5% on the Market value of the property Registration fees Rs.20/-.
Whereas I own Properties at …………………………… and ………………………. whereas I am shortly leaving for united States of America and whereas it is not Possible for ………………. the properties personally. I do hereby execute the ……………………. of attorney authoring the said …………………… the said …………… to act behalf.
To effectively manage all my Properties situate in ……………………….
To appear and act in all Courts Civil, Criminal, Original, Revisional or appellate in the Union of Indian.
To appear in any registration office and in any other office or Court and to sign, Verify and file plaints. Written statements and petitions and also to present appeals in any Court arising out of any matter relating to my Property or Properties.
To appoint and Constitute on my behalf pleaders, Vakils, advocates or other attorneys whereas and whenever my attorney shall think proper to do so.
To Compromise, Compound or withdraw Cases or refer them to arbitration.
To sign, verify and file applications for execution of decrees of any Court and to Purchase Properties at Court auction sales in execution of decrees upto the amount of decrees.
To negotiate and to arrange for the sale of my Properties to individuals or bodies on the terms and conditions agreeable to the said attorney.
To receive from the Purchasers, the sale amounts and to grant proper receipts.
To execute a proper deeds of Conveyance of the property to the purchasers.
To present Conveyance deeds executed by the said attorney before registering officers for registration to admit execution and receipt of Consideration to have the deeds registered and to do all acts and things necessary and incidental to the execution and Completion of registration and Conveying the Properties to the Purchasers as fully and effectively by in all respects as I could do the same my self.
To lease or mortgage the Properties and to execute any deed or deeds for the said purposes.
To register any such deeds before the registering officer having jurisdiction.
To Collect rents out of the properties to initiate legal Proceedings against defaulting tenants and to recover the rents in accordance with the law in force.
To take legal action against the tenants for beach or default of any of the Convenants of the lease or any understanding or to initiate proceedings in a Competant Court and if necessary in appellate or revisional Courts to which them and in Case of Proceedings filed against me by any body, to defend me in such Cases.
To open bank accounts in any Bank and to operate the funds.
To present documents executed by me before any registration of the said deeds.
To draw, accept, endorce, give, make or negotiate any Cheque, Bill, Hundi, Note grantee or other accurity whether of the State of Central Government or otherwise for any purpose.
To substitute and appoint any person or persons to act under or in place of the said attorney or attorneys in all the matters aforesaid and from time to time every such substitution and appointment at pleasure revoke.
I hereby agree to ratify and confirm all and whatsoever my said attorney shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue of these presents
I witness where of I, the said …………………………. have here to put my signature of ……………………………this ……………………… day of ……….2000.
Sd/-
Witnesses
Prepared & Writeen by :-
Note:- Stamp duty 5% on the Market value of the property Registration fees Rs.20/-.
MODEL SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS THAT I……………………………… S/o ………………………….age …………years, occupation ………………………………… R/o………………………………… Hereby nominate, constitute, appoint and retain:
Sri……………………………..S/o……………………………Age…………………….. Years, occupation…………………………R/o…………………………………………………. (hereinafter called the said Attorney) as may true and lawful Attorney to do in my name and on my behalf the following single act namely:
WHEREAS I am the owner of the property described in the schedule hereto (hereinafter called the said property)
Whereas I sold the said property to Sri ………………………..............……. S/o………………......……………………. R/o…………………………………………….. for Rs……………… (Rupees…………………..................…………………….only). and received the consideration amount in full.
Whereas I executed a sale deed alongwith annexures (hereafter collectively called the said deed for the purpose of brevity) in his favour on ……………….
WHEREAS I am unable to go to ………………………………. for procuring its registration.
NOW THEREFORE I hereby authorize the said Attorney to present the said sale deed before the Sub-Registrar ……………..admit execution and receipt of consideration on my behalf and do all things necessary for and incidental to procure the registration of the said sale deed.
I agree to confirm and ratify the said done by the said attorney in pursuance of these presents.
SCHEDULE OF PROPERTY
Boundaries :
North :
South :
NOTE :-
Stamp duty Rs.20/- Registration fees : 20/-
Sri……………………………..S/o……………………………Age…………………….. Years, occupation…………………………R/o…………………………………………………. (hereinafter called the said Attorney) as may true and lawful Attorney to do in my name and on my behalf the following single act namely:
WHEREAS I am the owner of the property described in the schedule hereto (hereinafter called the said property)
Whereas I sold the said property to Sri ………………………..............……. S/o………………......……………………. R/o…………………………………………….. for Rs……………… (Rupees…………………..................…………………….only). and received the consideration amount in full.
Whereas I executed a sale deed alongwith annexures (hereafter collectively called the said deed for the purpose of brevity) in his favour on ……………….
WHEREAS I am unable to go to ………………………………. for procuring its registration.
NOW THEREFORE I hereby authorize the said Attorney to present the said sale deed before the Sub-Registrar ……………..admit execution and receipt of consideration on my behalf and do all things necessary for and incidental to procure the registration of the said sale deed.
I agree to confirm and ratify the said done by the said attorney in pursuance of these presents.
SCHEDULE OF PROPERTY
Boundaries :
North :
South :
NOTE :-
Stamp duty Rs.20/- Registration fees : 20/-
DEED OF SETTLEMENT
This deed of Settlement executed this............................................... day of ............. By.............................. S/o................................................., W/o........................................... D/o.............................................Residing at .............................................. Taluk................................................ District........................................ (herein after called the Donor) in favour of W/o................................... residing at Taluk................................................ District therein after called the donee).
Whereas the Donor has no issues and donee is his/her............................ who is looking after the donor in his/her old age and residing with the donor and whereas the donor is desirous of Providing the donee certain immovable property out of love and affection towards the donee, the donor today gave the under mentioned properties worth Rs...................... (Rupees.............................................................. only) to the donee as free gift. The under mentioned properties are donor’s self acquired properties. The donee is put in possession of the properties this day and the donee can enjoy the properties this day and the donee can enjoy the properties with absolute rights and full rights of alienation. This deed of Settlement is executed with donor’s full consent and will and without any instigation or coercion.
Description of Property.
Sd/-
Witnesses :
Prepared & Written by...................................................Note:-Stamp duty 3 % on the Market value of the property if settlement is made within family members. It shall be 6% if otherwise. (Art. 49-A (a)). Registration fees 1% upto 50,000 and 0.50% there after.
Whereas the Donor has no issues and donee is his/her............................ who is looking after the donor in his/her old age and residing with the donor and whereas the donor is desirous of Providing the donee certain immovable property out of love and affection towards the donee, the donor today gave the under mentioned properties worth Rs...................... (Rupees.............................................................. only) to the donee as free gift. The under mentioned properties are donor’s self acquired properties. The donee is put in possession of the properties this day and the donee can enjoy the properties this day and the donee can enjoy the properties with absolute rights and full rights of alienation. This deed of Settlement is executed with donor’s full consent and will and without any instigation or coercion.
Description of Property.
Sd/-
Witnesses :
Prepared & Written by...................................................Note:-Stamp duty 3 % on the Market value of the property if settlement is made within family members. It shall be 6% if otherwise. (Art. 49-A (a)). Registration fees 1% upto 50,000 and 0.50% there after.
DEED OF LEASE
This Deed of Lease made the .................day of............ between of, etc., (hereinafter called "the Lessor"), of the one part and of etc., (hereinafter called "the Lessee"), of the other part, WITNESSESS, that in consideration of the rent reserved and of the Lessee’s covenants and the conditions to be observed and performed by him as hereinafter contained, the lessor do hereby grant, convey and transfer by way of lease to the lessee ALL THOSE premises, with compound, outhouses, appurtenance whatsoever, etc., bearing No.......and situate at, etc., : TO HAVE AN DTO HOLD the same to the lessee for the term of ................year (or years), with effect from the.....................day of................. at a monthly rent of Rupees.....................SUBJECT to the following terms and conditions:-
THE LESSEE hereby agrees with the lessor as follows:-
To pay the said rent, free and clear of all deductions, on the......... day of every current month in advance during the term of the lease; such payment shall be made at the address of the lessor as aforesaid.
To pay for and discharge and satisfy all rates, taxes, assessments and impositions (except the owner’s share of the house tax) which are now or during the said term be hereafter imposed or assess on the said premises, or the lessor or the lessee in respect thereof, by the authority of Government or otherwise.
At all times during the term of the lease to keep and maintain the premises clean, tidy, healthy, wind and watertight in all seasons and further in good and substantial repair, reasonable wear and tear and damage by fire or storm excepted.
To replace all broken fittings and fixtures by equally good or better substitutes and not to make any structural additions to the demised premises without the consent of the lessor first had and obtained in writing.
To permit the lessor, his servants and agents at all reasonable hours to enter into the property to inspect the condition or to leave notice of all defects to be repaired.
At all times during the said term to use and occupy the demised property as a private dewelling house for himself and the members of the family and not be keep any paying guests or share accommodation with outisders nor to carry on or permit to be carried on any offensive or prohibited trade or business in the said premises.
Without the consent in writing of the lessor, not to assign or party with his leasehold estate or interest in the said premises created under these presents nor sublet the same or any part thereof to any person or persons whomsoever, or make any structural addition or alteration therein
On the expiration or earlier determination of the lease to yield and deliver peaceful vacant possession of the premises in its entirety together with all improvements, if any, done thereto without any claim for compensation on that account.
THE LESSOR HEREBY AGREES WITH THE LESSEE AS FOLLOWS:-
At al times during the said term, to pay the owner’s share of house tax of the premises whenever the same falls due and his income-tax and other personal taxes as and where assessed.
That the lessee, paying the rent hereby reserved and observing and performing the conditions and covenants herein contained, shall quietly and peaceably hold, possess and enjoy the said premises during the said term without any interruption and disturbance by the lessor or any person claiming under or in trust for him: Provided, however, and it is expressly agreed and declared by and between the parties hereto that, in case of non-payment of rent fork any month beyond 2 days or in the event of breach of any of the conditions and covenants to be observed and performed by the lessee, the lease may at the option of the lessor stand determined when and in such an event the lessor shall be entitled to reenter into the property and repossess the same as his former estate without prejudice to his right to recover all arrears of rent and any damages for breach of such conditions and covenants.
IN WITNESS, ETC.,
Schedule of property
Signed, sealed and delivered.
THE LESSEE hereby agrees with the lessor as follows:-
To pay the said rent, free and clear of all deductions, on the......... day of every current month in advance during the term of the lease; such payment shall be made at the address of the lessor as aforesaid.
To pay for and discharge and satisfy all rates, taxes, assessments and impositions (except the owner’s share of the house tax) which are now or during the said term be hereafter imposed or assess on the said premises, or the lessor or the lessee in respect thereof, by the authority of Government or otherwise.
At all times during the term of the lease to keep and maintain the premises clean, tidy, healthy, wind and watertight in all seasons and further in good and substantial repair, reasonable wear and tear and damage by fire or storm excepted.
To replace all broken fittings and fixtures by equally good or better substitutes and not to make any structural additions to the demised premises without the consent of the lessor first had and obtained in writing.
To permit the lessor, his servants and agents at all reasonable hours to enter into the property to inspect the condition or to leave notice of all defects to be repaired.
At all times during the said term to use and occupy the demised property as a private dewelling house for himself and the members of the family and not be keep any paying guests or share accommodation with outisders nor to carry on or permit to be carried on any offensive or prohibited trade or business in the said premises.
Without the consent in writing of the lessor, not to assign or party with his leasehold estate or interest in the said premises created under these presents nor sublet the same or any part thereof to any person or persons whomsoever, or make any structural addition or alteration therein
On the expiration or earlier determination of the lease to yield and deliver peaceful vacant possession of the premises in its entirety together with all improvements, if any, done thereto without any claim for compensation on that account.
THE LESSOR HEREBY AGREES WITH THE LESSEE AS FOLLOWS:-
At al times during the said term, to pay the owner’s share of house tax of the premises whenever the same falls due and his income-tax and other personal taxes as and where assessed.
That the lessee, paying the rent hereby reserved and observing and performing the conditions and covenants herein contained, shall quietly and peaceably hold, possess and enjoy the said premises during the said term without any interruption and disturbance by the lessor or any person claiming under or in trust for him: Provided, however, and it is expressly agreed and declared by and between the parties hereto that, in case of non-payment of rent fork any month beyond 2 days or in the event of breach of any of the conditions and covenants to be observed and performed by the lessee, the lease may at the option of the lessor stand determined when and in such an event the lessor shall be entitled to reenter into the property and repossess the same as his former estate without prejudice to his right to recover all arrears of rent and any damages for breach of such conditions and covenants.
IN WITNESS, ETC.,
Schedule of property
Signed, sealed and delivered.
DEED OF MORTGAGE
This deed of Mortgage made the ........................................ day of ......................................... Between of etc., (hereinafter called "the Mortgagor") of the one part and of etc. (hereinafter called "the Mortgagee"), of the other part.
Whereas the Mortgagor is absolutely seized and possessed of or otherwise is well and sufficiently entitled to the property intended to be hereby mortgaged which is free from all encumbrances and attachments, AND WHEREAS the Mortgagee has agreed to lend and advance a sum of Rs....................... to the Mortgagor at his request upon having the repayment thereof, with interest at the rate hereunder stated and secured in the manner hereinafter expressed; NOW THIS DEED WITNESSES, that in pursuance of the said agreement and in consideration of the sum of Rupees….. paid to the morgagor by the Mortgagee simultaneously with the execution of these presents the receipt whereof the Mortgagor do hereby admit, acknowledge and confirm, the Mortgagor do hereby agree with the Mortgagee that the Mortgagor will on or before the ................................................ day of...................................... pay or cause to be paid to the Morgagee the sum of Rupees..................................... with interest for the same in the meantime at the rate of Rs........................... per cent per annum, such interest to be paid monthly and every month on the of each following month without any delay or default AND This deed further witnesseth that as a security for the repayment of the said loan with interest, the said do hereby charge, assure land mortgage, by way of simple mortgage, unto and in favour of the said ALL THAT, etc., (describe the property). (Further agreement allowing mortgagee’s remedies in case of failure to pay the mortgage money, as in previous precedent).
Usual covenants as to title, right to mortgage and non-encumbrances as in previous precedent.
The Schedule above referred to
IN WITNESS, etc.,
Signed, sealed & delivered.
NOTE:- Stamp duty 3% on the loan amount under Article 35 (b) of Schedule IA Registration fees 1% upto Rs.50,000 and 0.50% there after.
Whereas the Mortgagor is absolutely seized and possessed of or otherwise is well and sufficiently entitled to the property intended to be hereby mortgaged which is free from all encumbrances and attachments, AND WHEREAS the Mortgagee has agreed to lend and advance a sum of Rs....................... to the Mortgagor at his request upon having the repayment thereof, with interest at the rate hereunder stated and secured in the manner hereinafter expressed; NOW THIS DEED WITNESSES, that in pursuance of the said agreement and in consideration of the sum of Rupees….. paid to the morgagor by the Mortgagee simultaneously with the execution of these presents the receipt whereof the Mortgagor do hereby admit, acknowledge and confirm, the Mortgagor do hereby agree with the Mortgagee that the Mortgagor will on or before the ................................................ day of...................................... pay or cause to be paid to the Morgagee the sum of Rupees..................................... with interest for the same in the meantime at the rate of Rs........................... per cent per annum, such interest to be paid monthly and every month on the of each following month without any delay or default AND This deed further witnesseth that as a security for the repayment of the said loan with interest, the said do hereby charge, assure land mortgage, by way of simple mortgage, unto and in favour of the said ALL THAT, etc., (describe the property). (Further agreement allowing mortgagee’s remedies in case of failure to pay the mortgage money, as in previous precedent).
Usual covenants as to title, right to mortgage and non-encumbrances as in previous precedent.
The Schedule above referred to
IN WITNESS, etc.,
Signed, sealed & delivered.
NOTE:- Stamp duty 3% on the loan amount under Article 35 (b) of Schedule IA Registration fees 1% upto Rs.50,000 and 0.50% there after.
SALE DEED FORM
This deed of sale is executed on this........... day of ..............19 by Sri/Smt........................... S/o/W/o...............Occupation..............Aged..............years, residing at .....................(Principal), represented by his agent Sri...........................S/o .......................................Occupation ........................ aged.......... Years, residing at ......................................................by means of a General/Special Powers of ............................. Attorney dated .....................registered/authenticated as Document No.......................... of Book IV of Sub Registrar’s Office.............................. Being minor, represented by father/brother/mother and guardian Sri/Smt................................................ S/o.......................... W/o.................................. Occupation.................................... aged...........years,.......... residing at............................................. herein after called the 'VENDOR' which expression shall wherever it occurs in this deed includes his/her heirs, executors, assignees and administrators of one part.
In favor of Sri / Smt.................................S/o. D/o............................. Occupation.............................aged........... years, residing at ................................ Hereinafter called the 'VENDEE' of other part. Whereas the Vendor is the absolute owner, having acquired the property, which is more specifically and clearly delineated in the schedule hereto, by inheritance / by partition of joint family properties/ by release/by gift/by gift settlement/by will/by sale executed by ..............................................and registered as document No........of............. of Book ...................Volume No.................Pages..........................in the office of the Registrar / Sub-Registrar........................................ and since then he is in the possession and absolute enjoyment thereof.
(Space for special circumstances)
Whereas the vendor intends to sell away the said property mentioned in the schedule to clear off debt taken from .................................................................................. to meet marriage expenses........................../to meet the expenditure on higher education of children/to defray medical expenses/to meet domestic necessities and whereas the Vendee offered to purchase it for a sum of Rs.............for which the Vendor accepted and has agreed to sell the same to the Vendee.
Whereas the Vendor had given notice to the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceilings..................... Of the intended transfer of the property in favor of the purchaser vide acknowledgement dated............... And obtained clearance vide permission No....................
(Space for special circumstances if any)
NOW THIS DEED OF SALE WITNESSES :
That in consideration of payment of Rs..............(Rupees ) by cash/by Cheque No. Date: /by Demand Draft No..................Date.................by the Vendee to the Vendor/paid in the presence of the Sub-Registrar, the receipt of which the Vendor hereby acknowledges, the Vendor hereby sells, conveys, transfers and assigns unto the Vendee all his rights, title and interest, claim and demand whatsoever in the schedule mentioned property and delivers vacant possession thereof to the Vendee to hold the same absolutely for ever free from all encumbrances, together with all water sources, privileges, easements, appurtenances or any other things hidden in the earth belonging to or appurtenant thereto.
The Vender hereby assures the Vendee that the said property is free from all kinds of mortgage charges, agreements to sell, court litigations and any other statutory charges.
The Vendor further covenants with the Vendee that knowingly or otherwise he has not caused or allowed any distress to be levied on the said property.
The Vendor further assures the Vendee that he has got a clear, effectual, subsisting and marketable title to the said property and absolute authority to sell the same in the manner aforesaid.
The Vendor further covenants with the Vendee that if there remains any undisclosed and un-discharged liability in respect of the said property, he shall clear the same and the Vendee is free there from.
The Vendor further agrees to indemnify the Vendee and keep him free from disputes if any raised or objections made to this conveyance by any one and further should any claim be made or dispute raised at any time of any one in regard to this sale, the vendor hereby undertakes that he shall, at his own cost, settle the same and execute or cause to be executed such further acts, deeds and things as to more fully effectively convey title to the property hereby sold and conveyed to the Vendee.
The Vendor also assures the Vendee that if there remain any liability of taxes or rates for the said property to the Municipal Corporation / Municipality / Panchayat or other Government of statutory authorities up to the date of this conveyance, the Vendor shall clear the same and in case the same are collected from the Vendee, the Vendor shall pay the same to the vendee.
The Vendor further assures and covenants with the Vendee that the Vendee and his heirs are entitled to peacefully and absolutely enjoy the said property without let our hindrance from any person claiming through him or in trust form him.
The Vendee is hereby entitled to get the said property transferred in his name in all Panchayat / Municipal / Municipal Corporation records and enjoy the same with absolute rights forever.
Schedule
All that piece and parcel of the site/the land measuring Square yards or acres
Square meters/Guntas / cents in Survey No./T.S.No. together with the house bearing D.No. with a plinth area of square feet, situated at covered by ward No
Block No. of Municipal Corporation Area/Municipal Area/ Panchayat Board area and Sub-District and Bounded by :
East :West : North : South :
THE MEASUREMENTS :
East to West : North to South
This is neither an assigned nor a Government land. The market value of the property is Rs...........
In favor of Sri / Smt.................................S/o. D/o............................. Occupation.............................aged........... years, residing at ................................ Hereinafter called the 'VENDEE' of other part. Whereas the Vendor is the absolute owner, having acquired the property, which is more specifically and clearly delineated in the schedule hereto, by inheritance / by partition of joint family properties/ by release/by gift/by gift settlement/by will/by sale executed by ..............................................and registered as document No........of............. of Book ...................Volume No.................Pages..........................in the office of the Registrar / Sub-Registrar........................................ and since then he is in the possession and absolute enjoyment thereof.
(Space for special circumstances)
Whereas the vendor intends to sell away the said property mentioned in the schedule to clear off debt taken from .................................................................................. to meet marriage expenses........................../to meet the expenditure on higher education of children/to defray medical expenses/to meet domestic necessities and whereas the Vendee offered to purchase it for a sum of Rs.............for which the Vendor accepted and has agreed to sell the same to the Vendee.
Whereas the Vendor had given notice to the Special Officer and Competent Authority, Urban Land Ceilings..................... Of the intended transfer of the property in favor of the purchaser vide acknowledgement dated............... And obtained clearance vide permission No....................
(Space for special circumstances if any)
NOW THIS DEED OF SALE WITNESSES :
That in consideration of payment of Rs..............(Rupees ) by cash/by Cheque No. Date: /by Demand Draft No..................Date.................by the Vendee to the Vendor/paid in the presence of the Sub-Registrar, the receipt of which the Vendor hereby acknowledges, the Vendor hereby sells, conveys, transfers and assigns unto the Vendee all his rights, title and interest, claim and demand whatsoever in the schedule mentioned property and delivers vacant possession thereof to the Vendee to hold the same absolutely for ever free from all encumbrances, together with all water sources, privileges, easements, appurtenances or any other things hidden in the earth belonging to or appurtenant thereto.
The Vender hereby assures the Vendee that the said property is free from all kinds of mortgage charges, agreements to sell, court litigations and any other statutory charges.
The Vendor further covenants with the Vendee that knowingly or otherwise he has not caused or allowed any distress to be levied on the said property.
The Vendor further assures the Vendee that he has got a clear, effectual, subsisting and marketable title to the said property and absolute authority to sell the same in the manner aforesaid.
The Vendor further covenants with the Vendee that if there remains any undisclosed and un-discharged liability in respect of the said property, he shall clear the same and the Vendee is free there from.
The Vendor further agrees to indemnify the Vendee and keep him free from disputes if any raised or objections made to this conveyance by any one and further should any claim be made or dispute raised at any time of any one in regard to this sale, the vendor hereby undertakes that he shall, at his own cost, settle the same and execute or cause to be executed such further acts, deeds and things as to more fully effectively convey title to the property hereby sold and conveyed to the Vendee.
The Vendor also assures the Vendee that if there remain any liability of taxes or rates for the said property to the Municipal Corporation / Municipality / Panchayat or other Government of statutory authorities up to the date of this conveyance, the Vendor shall clear the same and in case the same are collected from the Vendee, the Vendor shall pay the same to the vendee.
The Vendor further assures and covenants with the Vendee that the Vendee and his heirs are entitled to peacefully and absolutely enjoy the said property without let our hindrance from any person claiming through him or in trust form him.
The Vendee is hereby entitled to get the said property transferred in his name in all Panchayat / Municipal / Municipal Corporation records and enjoy the same with absolute rights forever.
Schedule
All that piece and parcel of the site/the land measuring Square yards or acres
Square meters/Guntas / cents in Survey No./T.S.No. together with the house bearing D.No. with a plinth area of square feet, situated at covered by ward No
Block No. of Municipal Corporation Area/Municipal Area/ Panchayat Board area and Sub-District and Bounded by :
East :West : North : South :
THE MEASUREMENTS :
East to West : North to South
This is neither an assigned nor a Government land. The market value of the property is Rs...........
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